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ABSTRACT
The entry into force of the World Trade Organization (WTO) TRIPS
Agreement in 1995 transformed the international intellectual property
system. The harmonization of basic intellectual property standards has
operated to protect investment in innovation, limiting risks from unjustified
‘free riding’. Yet these same harmonized IP standards sharply curtailed the
traditional capacity of suppliers of public goods, such as health care and
nutrition, to address priority needs of less affluent members of society,
particularly in (but not limited to) developing countries. In the Doha
Declaration, the Waiver Decision of 30 August 2003 and the Article 31bis
Protocol of Amendment, stakeholders concerned with re-opening policy
space for the supply of newer pharmaceutical products pushed back against
restrictive elements of the TRIPS Agreement.
Governments around the world are in the process of deciding whether to
ratify and accept the Article 31bis Amendment. Based on their Study for the
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament, the authors
argue that acceptance of the Amendment will provide a ‘net benefit’ for
countries seeking to improve access to medicines. At the insistence of WTO
delegations acting on behalf of the originator pharmaceutical industry
lobby, Article 31bis regrettably is saddled with unnecessary administrative
hurdles. Nonetheless, through skillful lawyering, political determination
and coordinated planning, the system can be made to work. Among other
options, expeditious back-to-back compulsory licensing linked with pooled
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procurement strategies may effectively achieve economies of scale in pro-
duction and distribution of medicines.
The authors doubt that the international political environment would support
renegotiation of an ‘improved’ solution. They express concern that failure to
bring the Amendment into force will open the door to a campaign to
undermine the Waiver Decision. Recent events in Brazil and Thailand
illustrate both the opportunities and risks associated with implementing
TRIPS exception mechanisms, and help to inform views on the negotiating
environment. Specific proposals for regional cooperation in implementing the
Amendment are laid out, and the authors emphasize the importance of
pursuing concrete transfer of technology measures in support of developing
country pharmaceutical manufacturing. Over-reliance on private market
mechanisms for the supply of public health goods leaves the international
community with an unresolved collective action problem on a large scale.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By harmonizing minimum levels of protection in the territories of some 150
World Trade Organization (WTO) Members, the TRIPS Agreement’s pro-
visions on patents, copyrights and other forms of intellectual property aimed to
improve the overall framework conditions for the transfer of knowledge and
technology in a global marketplace.1 One primary goal of this Agreement was
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 15 April 1994, in World Trade
Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations 321 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org. See
generally, UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, (Cambridge University
Press 2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org.
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to prohibit Member governments from allowing unbridled free-riding on
foreign creations and innovations under the limiting assumptions of territori-
ality,2 which subject exporters of knowledge goods to the vagaries of national
treatment in the absence of countervailing treaties.3 A second major goal was to
secure to inventors and creators a return on their investments from the sale or
licensing of innovative knowledge goods anywhere within the supranational
market for goods and services regulated by the TRIPS Agreement.4
There is growing evidence that this component of the Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO of 19945 has fulfilled these goals by substantially elevating
the returns (or ‘rents’) to technology-exporting countries in the period since
its adoption.6 An ‘incipient transnational system of innovation’ emerging
from the TRIPS Agreement7 has likewise created incentives and opportuni-
ties for entrepreneurs even in developing countries who are or become
capable of producing and exporting knowledge goods to an increasingly
competitive global market.8
At the same time, the TRIPS Agreement—increasingly supplemented by
an array of TRIPS-plus intellectual property norms adopted in posterior
multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements9—has greatly complicated the
work of government ministries in developing countries at all levels of the per
2 Frederick M. Abbott, ‘Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework’, 22 Vand J Transnat’l L 689 (1989) and
Jerome H. Reichman, ‘From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement’ 29 NYU J. Int’l L. Pol. 11 (1996).
3 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), as last amended 1967,
Article 2(1); Microsoft Corp. v AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); ITC Limited v Punchgini,
Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that US trademark law remains territorial and
cannot provide internationally required protection of famous marks under the TRIPS
Agreement until Congress adopts implementing legislation).
4 Keith E. Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Rights In the Global Economy’ (IIE 2002); Jane Ginsburg,
Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the ‘‘Three Step Test’’
for Copyright Exceptions, 187 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 3, 2001. See also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus and Andreas L. Lowenfeld, ‘Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together’, 37 Va J Int’l L 275 (1997).
5 See above n 1.
6 See e.g. Frederick M. Abbott, ‘Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism’, 8 J Int’l Econ L 77
(2005), and references cited at n 13.
7 Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods
and the Privatization of Global Public Goods’, in K.E. Maskus and J.H. Reichman (eds),
International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property
Regime 3–45 (Cambridge University Press 2005) [hereinafter ‘IP and International Public
Goods’].
8 See e.g. Joseph Straus, ‘The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The
Role of Intellectual Property Rights Systems’, 6 J Marshall Rev Intell Prop 1 (2006); Keith E.
Maskus, Kamal Saggi and Thitima Puttitanum, ‘Patent Rights and International Technology
Transfer’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7, 265–81.
9 At the multilateral level, see e.g. WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996); WIPO Performers and
Phonogram Producers Treaty (1996), available at <http://www.wipo.int>. See also negotiations
on a draft SPLT, documents available at <http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/harmonization.
htm>; John Barton et al., Views on the Future of the Intellectual Property System, UNCTAD-ICTSD
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capita GDP spectrum.10 Both the private and public sectors in these coun-
tries must now reconcile their technology catch-up policies and strategies
with higher levels of intellectual property protection than developed coun-
tries had in the past faced at comparable stages in their own economic
development trajectories.11 Although these obstacles significantly increase
the costs of economic development, one can arguably rationalize them as
part of a bargained-for exchange that allowed developing country exporters
of more traditional goods a greater access to markets in OECD countries.12
A. Adverse impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the provision
of public goods
Less obvious, and often more insidious, are the difficulties and social costs
that higher intellectual property standards under TRIPS and later FTAs
have created for developing country governments’ abilities to maintain the
supply of such basic public goods as nutrition and agriculture, education,
public health, environmental safety, scientific research and industrial policy
(including the maintenance of a competitive rather than a command econ-
omy, where so desired).13 While these countries have unquestionably
benefited from a shift to more open markets in the past two decades, their
traditional responsibilities for the provision of essential public goods—
already limited by a lack of resources and the relative poverty of their
citizenries—has been further hampered by the adverse exercise of private
rights in technical inputs and in other indispensable knowledge goods that
were formerly unprotected, or in the public domain, or otherwise available at
lower, more competitive prices.14
In retrospect, a glaring defect of the multilateral trade negotiations
that produced the TRIPS Agreement was the extent to which a powerful
coalition of private technology exporters controlled the agenda, with
few counterbalancing inputs from representatives of users, consumers,
small and medium-sized entrepreneurs or—most crucial for present
Selected Issue Briefs No. 1 (April 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org, and; further
discussion below nn 187–211 text, regarding regional and bilateral FTAs.
10 Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, ‘Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property
Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements’ (World Bank Trade Note No. 20, 2005).
11 See e.g. Margaret Chon, ‘Intellectual Property and the Development Divide’, 27 Cardozo L
Rev 2821 (2006); Ruth Okediji, ‘Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the
TRIPS Agreement’, 17 Emory Int’l L Rev 819 (2003, Peter K. Yu et al., ‘China and the
WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects’, 17 Colum J Asian L 1 (2003).
12 See discussion of Uruguay Round reciprocal bargain assumptions in Abbott, ‘Protecting First
World Assets’, above n 2.
13 Maskus and Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods’, above n 7. See
also, Joseph Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good (1998), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/articles/undpk2/index.htm; Peter Drahos, ‘The
Regulation of Public Goods’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7, 46–64.
14 See generally IP and International Public Goods, above n 7.
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purposes—advocates representing the needs of the public sector as such.15
The dialectic between public and private interests that typically accompanies
domestic intellectual property legislation in developed countries was thus
sacrificed in international trade forums to a system of ‘traded benefits’ in
other goods and services—influenced by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade’s (GATT’s) tradition and procedures16–which operated outside
the customary intellectual property universe of discourse and was often
deliberately indifferent to its values and methods.17
What began as a coordinated effort to improve a rudimentary worldwide
intellectual property system, with particular regard to patents, thus ended with
a push to ever higher levels of protection favoring the owners of existing
innovation, with little regard for the needs of future innovators or the general
public interest in access to knowledge and free competition.18 On the contrary,
long-established balancing mechanisms (including, in certain instances,
even those in the developed countries19) have been overwhelmed and held
captive by a proliferation of international intellectual property standards that
the momentum behind the TRIPS process continues to generate in multi-
lateral, regional and bilateral arrangements.20
Nowhere have these tensions been more acute than in the pharmaceutical
sector.21 And in no other sector has the countervailing push by adversely
15 See e.g. Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property
Rights (Cambridge: 2003); Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property: A Critical
History (Lynne Rienner: 2005); Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
Who Owns the Knowledge Economy (Earthscan 2002).
16 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) and (1947), available at http://www.wto.org.
See generally, John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Bobbs-Merrill 1969) and
John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and
Economic Relations (Cambridge 2000).
17 See e.g. Peter Gerhart, ‘Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Public
Goods’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7, 69–77.
18 See e.g. Rochelle C. Dreyfus, ‘TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?’, 71 U Chi L R
21 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘WTO Dispute Resolution
and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science under International Law’, in IP and
International Public Goods, above n 7, 861–83; Gregory Shaffer, ‘Recognizing Public Goods in
WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates, Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patents Protection’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7, 884–908.
19 See e.g. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 USC 1201 et seq., and European Parliament
and Council Directive on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, Directive 2001/29/EC, O.J. 2001 No. L 167. See generally,
Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie and Pamela Samuelson, ‘A Reverse Notice and
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted
Works’, 22 Berkeley J Law and Tech (forthcoming 2007).
20 See above n 9 and below nn 187–211 and accompanying text. However, these pressures have
begun to elicit increasingly stronger countervailing reactions. See e.g. WIPO Development
Agenda, below n 174. See also Jerome H. Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
‘Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent
Law Treaty’, 57 Duke L J 85 (2007); CPTech proposed Treaty on Access to Knowledge,
draft of 9 May 2005, available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf.
21 See e.g. Frederick M. Abbott, ‘Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring
Access to Essential Medicines’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7 and
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affected stakeholders succeeded in re-establishing a new but still untested
equilibrium between public and private interests.
B. Impact of the TRIPS Agreement on access to medicines
in developing countries
Before the TRIPS Agreement of 1994 entered into force, developing country
governments retained relatively unrestricted power to regulate public health,
with little interference from international intellectual property law. Although
the decolonization process saddled many (if not most) developing countries
with membership in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property of 1883,22 the provisions of that Agreement concerning patented
inventions dealt mainly with rules of priority and national treatment.23 It
otherwise left states free to devise and implement their own patent systems
and, as many chose to do, even to deny any patent protection for pharma-
ceutical products at all.24
In this environment, the ability of developing and least-developed
countries (LDCs) to obtain essential medicines varied with respect to their
procurement methods, local production capabilities, public health policies
and general financial resources. The chief limitations on supply were not of a
formal legal character, except insofar as the prevailing conditions of legal
uncertainty affecting knowledge and technology transfer generally may have
inhibited investment in or the diffusion of medicines benefiting Third World
countries.25
The key factors rather depended on the reverse engineering capacities
of generic suppliers and their pricing policies; on the availability of key active
Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS II, Asia and the Mercantile Pharmaceutical War: Implications for
Innovation and Access, Stanford Center for International Development, Working Paper No.
308 (December 2006).
22 See above n 3. For historical background and information on operation of the Paris
Convention, see F. Abbott, T. Cottier and F. Gurry, International Intellectual Property in an
Integrated World Economy 161–77 (Aspen 2007).
23 E.g. Paris Convention, above n 3, Articles 2(1) and 4bis.
24 E.g. Switzerland and Italy did not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products until
1977 and 1978, respectively. Fabio Pammolli, Laura Magazzini and Luigi Orsenigo, ‘The
Intensity of Competition after Patent Expiry in Pharmaceuticals: A Cross-Country Analysis’,
99 Rev d’Econ Indus (2002), http://rei.revues.org/document11.html. India did not provide
pharmaceutical product patent protection until 2005.
25 See e.g. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, above n 4 (stressing positive
impact of TRIPS norms on the availability of high-tech products for acquisition by developing
countries, apart from licensing opportunities as such); Keith E. Maskus, Transfer of Technology
and Technological Capacity Building, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd Bellagio Series on
Development and Intellectual Property, 18–21 September 03, available at <http://
www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Maskus_Bellagio2.pdf>. See also, Alan O.
Sykes, ‘Public Health and International Law: TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing
Countries, and the Doha ‘‘Solution’’ ’ 3 Chi J Int’l l 47 (2002) (addressing need for
international incentives in risky pharmaceutical sector).
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pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) on the world market; on the pricing
policies of the big pharmaceutical companies (and any countervailing local
regulatory framework); and on the well-known failure of the research-based
pharmaceutical industries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries to invest in R&D directed at diseases
that primarily afflicted the poorer countries. The growing ability of some
middle-income developing countries to produce low-cost generic medicines
under these regimes—notably in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Thailand,
Egypt, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea—made it increasingly possible
for even poor states to obtain certain low-cost generic medicines on the
world market, whether such products were on or off patents.26
1. End of the transitional periods
Once the TRIPS Agreement of 1994 took effect, however, and its limited
transitional periods expired in 2005, this situation changed radically. All
developing countries (but not the LDCs) became liable to adopt and enforce
all the TRIPS patent standards, and these standards necessarily applied to
medicines in all WTO member countries (except LDCs) from 2005
onwards.27 With the passage of time (and the opening of ‘mail boxes’
holding pharmaceutical patent applications during the transitional peri-
ods),28 more and more essential medicines (for example, the so-called
second- and third-line HIV drugs) will be on patent in all countries capable
of supplying them to the world market,29 at least until the relevant patents
expire in those countries.30
The availability of these drugs will thus depend on the pricing strategies of
patent holders and on the countervailing regulatory measures states may
adopt to influence them. Moreover, further efforts to tighten international
intellectual property standards continue today under the Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT) negotiations ongoing at the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO),31 and especially under Free Trade Agreements and
Bilateral Trade Agreements, which adversely affect ministries of health.
26 See Abbott, TRIPS II, above n 21.
27 See Frederick M. Abbott, ‘The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and
the Protection of Public Health‘, 99 Am J Int’l L 317, 320–24 (2004) [hereinafter ‘Abbott,
WTO Medicines Decision’].
28 Ibid and Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation (August 2006). University of
Pittsburgh School of Law Working Paper Series. Working Paper 43, at http://law.bepress.com/
pittlwps/papers/art43.
29 See e.g. MSF Access to Medicines Campaign, The Second-Line AIDS Crisis: Condemned to
Repeat?, 11 April 2007, at < http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/access/thailand_
briefingdoc_04-11-2007.cfm>.
30 Although many blockbuster patents in the United States will soon expire, this does not
directly affect the status of such patents abroad. See Paris Convention, above n 3, Article 4
bis(2).
31 See discussion of draft Substantive Law Patent Treaty (SPLT), below text accompanying nn
172–83.
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These ministries have little influence on intellectual property-related negotia-
tions, conducted between trade negotiators, and they often remain powerless to
modify or block problematic demands in response to ‘take it or leave it’ tactics.32
Meanwhile, the prospective social costs of further limiting poor countries’
access to generic medicines after the TRIPS transition periods expired
precipitated a growing crisis—largely focused on the AIDS pandemic—that
might eventually have threatened the stability of the WTO itself. In a
responsive effort to bolster the vertical powers of poor countries to maintain
the supply of essential medicines as part of their public health responsi-
bilities, despite elevated international intellectual property standards,
the WTO Ministerial Conference adopted the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in November 2001.33
2. The new compulsory licensing scheme
This Declaration reconfirmed many of the so-called flexibilities built into the
TRIPS Agreement, including the right of Members to issue compulsory
licenses on public-interest grounds.34 The Declaration then provided the
mandate for amplifying existing flexibilities by establishing legal machinery to
enable countries lacking the capacity to manufacture generic substitutes for
costly patented medicines under domestically issued compulsory licenses
to obtain imports from countries able and willing to assist them without
intererence from the relevant patent holders.35 This solution, which also
improved the export opportunities for the generic pharmaceutical sectors in
emerging economies, such as Brazil, China and India, was initially embodied
in a waiver known as the Decision of 30 August 2003.36 It would be ren-
dered permanent in the form of an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement,
known as Article 31bis, whose ratification is currently under consideration by
many governments.37
32 See e.g. Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
and the Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements, Quaker United
Nations Office (Geneva), Occasional Paper No. 14, April 2004 and Frederick M. Abbott,
Trade Diplomacy, the Rule of Law and the Problem of Asymmetric Risks in TRIPS, Quaker United
Nations Office (Geneva), Occasional Paper No. 13, September 2003.
33 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (14 November 2001), Doc. WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/2 (20 November 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
34 Ibid, para 5(b). See Jerome H. Reichman with Catherine Hasenzahl, Nonvoluntary Licensing of
Patented Inventions, ICTSD/UNCTAD Issue Paper No. 5 (2003); Frederick M. Abbott, ‘The
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at
the WTO’, 5 J Int’l Econ L 469 (2002).
35 For the foundational authority, see Doha Declaration on Public Health, above n 33, para 6,
and discussion in Abbott, ‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27.
36 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health (30 August 2003), Doc. WT/L/540 (1 September 2003) [hereinafter ‘Waiver
Decision’].
37 WTO General Council Decision of 6 December 2005, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,
WT/L/641, 8 Dec. 2005, with attachment ‘Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’ (with
Annex setting out Article 31bis) [hereinafter ‘Protocol of Amendment’ or ‘Amendment’].
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How the developing countries adapt this and other TRIPS flexibilities to
the needs of their national and regional systems of innovation will ultimately
determine both the direction of future R&D in the global pharmaceutical
sector and the extent to which all WTO Members, and especially the devel-
oping countries and LDCs, will be able to provide essential medicines at
affordable prices under their domestic public health programs. In this
calculus, the potential role of the proposed Article 31bis Amendment to shift
the pharmaceutical companies pricing strategies from a ‘low volume, high
margin’ approach to a ‘high volume, low margin’ approach is of primary
importance.38
However, the attainment of these objectives remains largely dependent on
the willingness of both importing and exporting countries not only to ratify
the permanent amendment, but also to enact enabling domestic legislation,
such as the European Regulation.39 Ultimate success also depends on the
willingness of participating countries to adopt ancillary policies and strategies
favoring cooperation rather than conflict among the various stakeholders,
and on the willingness of the private generic industry to invest in the
production and distribution of needed medicines at affordable prices under
the amended TRIPS provisions.
3. The ratification process
The complexities involved in organizing and coordinating cooperative
ventures along these lines have recently been highlighted in the course of
the European Parliament’s ongoing deliberations concerning ratification of
the Amended TRIPS provisions.40 Because the pending Amendment has
elicited considerable criticism from NGOs and others,41 the Parliament’s
International Trade Committee commissioned an in-depth analysis of the
Article 31bis incorporates an ‘‘Annex to the TRIPS Agreement’’. Further references to
‘‘Annex’’ herein are to this ‘‘Annex to the TRIPS Agreement’’ incorporated by Article 31bis.
38 See Ministry of Public Health and National Health Security Office, Thailand, Facts and
Evidence on the 10 Burning Issues Related to the Government Use of Patents on Three
Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand, February 2007, ISBN 978-974-94591-5-7 [hereinafter
the ‘Thai White Paper’].
39 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on compulsory licensing of patents
relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public
health problems, 2004/0258 (COD), PE-CONS 3674/05, Brussels, 12 April 2006.
40 Developments are reported on the website of the European Parliament. The debates and
Resolution adopted by the Parliament in July 2007 pertaining to the ratification process are
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-
TA-2007-0353+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
41 See e.g. MSF Access to Medicines Campaign, Doha Derailed, A Progress Report on TRIPS and
Access to Medicines, 27 August 2003 and Neither Expeditious, Nor A Solution: The WTO August
30th Decision Is Unworkable: An illustration through Canada’s Jean Chre´tien Pledge to Africa,
Prepared for the XVI International AIDS Conference, Toronto, August 2006, and Oxfam
International, Patents versus Patients, Five years after the Doha Declaration, Oxfam Briefing
Paper 95, November 2006.
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system envisioned by the Amendment and the prospects for its successful
implementation. In particular, the Committee sought advice not only on the
specific question of ratifying the Amendment as drafted, or not, but also on
ways and means of ensuring its successful implementation, with a view to
formulating an agreed policy framework with the European Commission,
which will have primary responsibility for that task.42
The authors of this article were invited to write that Study,43 and many
of our recommendations have been endorsed provisionally in a resolution of
the European Parliament, which has deferred actual ratification pending
further negotiations with the European Commission.44 The outcome of these
deliberations will necessarily influence the way many other countries—both
developed and developing—address the ratification issue once the European
Parliament commits the Community to pursuing the goals embodied in the
Amendment and in the larger policy framework of the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health.45
The purpose of this article is accordingly to review and analyze the pro-
posed Amendment in its historical context and to translate the findings of
our Study for the European Parliament into a broader set of policy consid-
erations and recommendations. We hope that it will assist all policymakers
and stakeholders likely to be involved in the coming struggle to reconcile
incentives to innovate in the worldwide pharmaceutical sector with access to
those same innovative products under the new legal framework established
by the Amendment.
In what follows, we will first briefly depict the evolving legal infrastructure
affecting the supply of pharmaceuticals to developing countries, in which the
Protocol of Amendment concerning Article 31bis is a major component. We
shall then evaluate the prospects for implementing the amended flexibilities
42 Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Specifications, No. EXPO/B/INTA/
2007/14.
43 Frederick M. Abbott and Jerome H. Reichman, Study, Access to Essential Medicines:
Lessons Learned Since the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
and Policy Options for the European Union, Directorate General External Policies of the
European Union, EXPO/B/INTA/2007/14 June 2007 PE 381.392 (prepared for the
International Trade Committee, European Parliament) [hereinafter ‘Abbott and Reichman,
Study’].
44 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and access to
medicines, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0353, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-2007->. See also David Cronin, Parliament Delays
WTO IP Health Deal Till EU Boosts Bilateral Drug Access, IP-Watch, 12 July 2007.
45 On October 24, 2007, the European Parliament gave its assent to acceptance by the
European Community of the Protocol of Amendment. See European Parliament legislative
resolution of 24 October 2007 on the proposal for a Council decision on the acceptance, on
behalf of the European Community, of the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement, done
at Geneva on 6 December 2005 (8934/2006-C6-0359/2006-2006/0060(AVC), P6_TA(2007)
0459. This was preceded by the reading of a Statement by the Council reflecting certain key
understandings (text in authors’ files).
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with some hope of success, and we shall also consider certain alternative or
complementary strategies. Finally, we draw conclusions and make recom-
mendations concerning these and other related issues, which governments
inclined to ratify the Amendment may wish to consider.
II. THE EVOLVING LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Governments around the world are currently considering46 whether to ratify
and accept the Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement adopted by WTO Mem-
bers on 6 December 2005, which would formally add a new Article 31bis
to that Agreement.47 Proposed Article 31bis reflects the terms of the WTO
Decision of 30 August 2003 (hereinafter the ‘Waiver Decision’).48
It established a waiver of certain obligations under the TRIPS Agreement for
the purpose of permitting exports of patented medicines under government use
and other compulsory licenses that might otherwise be prevented by the terms
of the TRIPS Agreement as it entered into force on 1 January 1995.49
The Waiver Decision and Amendment have been criticized for imposing
unnecessary obstacles to the effective use of compulsory licensing by coun-
tries with inadequate production capacity,50 and indeed they are not the
optimal solution for stakeholders seeking the most administratively simple or
expeditious mechanism for permitting exports under compulsory license.
None of the parties involved in the negotiations believed that this was the
result achieved, nor did the negotiators overlook the possibility of attaining a
more user-friendly or expeditious process. The fact is that WTO Members
negotiating on behalf of the originator pharmaceutical industry would not
accept such a solution. It is doubtful that the basic positions of the Members
46 As of 13 September 2007, 10 WTO Members had formally accepted the Amendment: (i)
United States (17 December 2005); (ii) Switzerland (13 September 2006); (iii) El Salvador
(19 September 2006); (iv) Rep. of Korea (24 January 2007); (v) Norway (5 February 2007);
(vi) India (26 March 2007); (vii) Philippines (30 March 2007); (viii) Israel (10 August 2007);
(ix) Japan (31 August 2007) (x) Australia (12 September 2007). Information from WTO
website at <http://www.wto.org. Ratification by the European Communities is pending
approval of the European Parliament. The ‘European Communities’ is the formal Member of
the WTO, along with each of the Member States of the EU. Presumably it is the ‘European
Communities’ that would submit an instrument of acceptance to the WTO regarding the
Amendment on behalf of the ‘regional entity in Europe’.
47 See above n 37.
48 See above n 36.
49 See generally, Abbott, ‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27 and Frederick M. Abbott and
Rudolph van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health, A Guide and Model
Documents for Implementation of the Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision, World Bank
Working Paper No. 61 (2005) [hereinafter ‘World Bank Models’].
50 See above n 41. It is interesting to note that while the EU was arguably the key architect of
most of the limitations incorporated into the Amendment, the EU has adopted a Regulation
to implement the Waiver Decision that shows a strong appreciation for the flexibilities that
remain open to countries in making use of the system. See Abbott and Reichman, Study,
above n 43 (analyzing the EU Implementing Regulation), above n 39.
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that played leading roles in the negotiations have significantly changed since
the Waiver Decision was adopted.51
The Waiver Decision was the result of a long and complex negotiation
among a substantial number of interested stakeholders, many of whom had
widely different perspectives regarding the optimal outcome. Both the Waiver
and the Amendment nonetheless represent a formal lowering of intellectual
property (IP) protection standards imposed by the TRIPS Agreement. The
traditional demandeurs of high standards of IP protection lose something they
gained in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.
Empirically, moreover, because the transitional periods pertaining to
patented pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement have only recently
expired, the WTO lacks experience with the operation of the Waiver Deci-
sion or with the few implementing regulations that Members have adopted
to date.52 Indeed, Rwanda in 2007, has become the first country to trigger
the mechanisms established by the 2003 Waiver.53 Thus, there is neither a
strong experiential basis for recommending acceptance of the Amendment,
nor of declining to accept it. The question is largely political, in the sense
that one must ask whether, and from whose perspective, an ‘improved’
Amendment might be negotiated or the chances for its effective implementa-
tion might be strengthened.
The authors are inclined to believe there is not much room in the present
global political environment for negotiating a different deal from the one
presently on the table. They also believe that the Amendment can play a net
positive role from the standpoint of public health, even if it is not the optimal
solution from the perspective of any interested stakeholder. While it is
virtually impossible to predict whether the negotiating environment will
change in the direction of improving the terms of the Amendment, there is
some possibility that time will work against the existing waiver solution,
notwithstanding the legal commitment by WTO Members that it should
continue in effect indefinitely (until an Amendment is accepted by all Mem-
bers).54 These considerations may ultimately argue in favor of ratifying and
accepting the Amendment, imperfect though it may be.
51 The current G-8 focus on IP enforcement led by the German presidency, and the negotia-
ting texts of EU Economic Partnership Agreements, suggest that the EU would not
negotiate again today certain more permissive aspects of the Amendment, that it accepted in
the past.
52 Including Canada, China, the EU, India, Norway and Switzerland (in process). See e.g.
Abbott, ‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27.
53 See Rwanda, Notification Under Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, Circulated 17 July 2007, WTO Council for TRIPS, IP/N/9/RWA/1, 19 July
2007.
54 See Waiver Decision, above n 36, at para 11.
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A. India and the problem of exports under Article 31(f)
To set the Amendment in context, we note that the potential problem
posed by Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement was identified prior to the
decision by developing countries to initiate, in June 2001, a review within
the TRIPS Council of the effects of the agreement on public health.
While Article 31 generally permits WTO Members to issue compulsory
licenses, subject to certain procedural requirements, on grounds of their
own choosing,55 Article 31(f) limits exports under these licenses by requiring
that ‘any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use’.56
The core of the problem was recognition that, on 1 January 2005, India
would be required to implement pharmaceutical product patent protection,
and to review the pharmaceutical patent applications that were collected
in its ‘mailbox’ between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2004. Because
India—unlike most developing countries—had taken advantage of the
10-year transition period for providing pharmaceutical product patent
protection, it had developed and maintained a world-class generic produc-
tion capacity for drugs that were otherwise on-patent in developed
(and many developing) countries. It was this unique generic production
capacity that had enabled Indian manufacturers to break the price
stranglehold of the originator companies with respect to key antiretroviral
(ARV) treatments.57
Because the TRIPS Agreement forced India to patent pharmaceutical
products developed after 1 January 2005, new drugs, such as second- or
third-line ARVs, would probably not be available in generic form, and some
first-line ARVs might become subject to essentially late-stage patent
protection.58 The precise effects of the 1 January 2005 transition in India
would largely depend on the terms and implementation of India’s amended
Patent Act.
55 See Reichman with Hasenzahl, above n 34.
56 TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, Article 31(f).
57 CIPLA offered annual per patient ARV treatment at about US$350 when the originator
prices were in the $10,000 range. This revolutionized the HIV-AIDS treatment environment
in the developing world. See Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Untangling the web of price
reductions, a pricing guide for the purchase of ARVs for developing countries, 8th edn, at 10,
available at <http://www.accessmedmsf.org/documents/untanglingtheweb%208.pdf>. See also
Abbott, ‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27, at 320–24. It appeared that a substantial
part of the first-line ARV drug library was invented and patented outside India prior to
initiation of the mailbox requirement on 1 January 1995, and those drugs (at least in
noncombination form) would not be subject to patenting. There was some question with
regard to combinations, such as the widely used ‘Combivir’ patented outside India by Glaxo.
The potential for patenting of combinations may depend on interpretation of the specific
terms of India’s new patent legislation. For a few ARVs, there might be issues regarding the
appropriate filing and/or priority date that would influence whether or not the drugs would
come under patent.
58 See above n 57.
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From the earliest days of developing-country consideration of the Article
31(f) problem, moreover, it was widely recognized that the need for low-cost
generic supplies of newer medicines in developing countries extended well
beyond ARVs, or treatment for malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious
diseases. Coronary disease, cancer, diabetes, asthma and other disorders are
major causes of morbidity and mortality in developing countries, as WHO
statistical reports demonstrate. Therefore, any solution to the Article 31(f)
problem had necessarily to extend beyond HIV-AIDS.
Given these premises, the developing countries attempted to establish a
straightforward and expeditious solution that would rely on both Articles 30
and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. First, they wanted an express under-
standing that WTO Members are able to use the Article 30 provision on
exceptions to the scope of patent protection in order to authorize production
and export ‘to address public health needs in importing Members’.59 Under
the logic of this approach, a Member authorizing exports to another country
that lacked production capacity allowing it to proceed under a compulsory
license of its own, would be viewed as having inflicted minimal harm on the
patentee in the exporting country. Second, based on the underlying concept
of ‘comity’ familiar to international lawyers, WTO Members with adequate
capacity would have been authorized to ‘give effect’ to compulsory licenses
issued by other members, and to export pursuant to those licenses,60 without
any requirement for back-to-back licensing, as was ultimately adopted in the
Waiver Decision and Protocol of Amendment.61
However, both the United States and the European Union (EU) rejected
this proposal by the developing countries to resolve the Article 31(f) problem
at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, and instead nego-
tiated the well-known Paragraph 6 formula.62 Paragraph 6 triggered two
59 General Council, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal
by the African Group, et al., IP/C/W/312, WT/GC/W/450, 4 October 2001 (01-4803),
available at http://www.wto.org.
60 See suggestion in Communication from the European Communities and Their Member
States, The relationship between the provisions of the TRIPS agreement and access to
medicines, IP/C/W/280, 12 June 2001 and EU Commission, Compulsory Licensing and Data
Protection, Legal Issues related to Compulsory Licensing under the TRIPS Agreement
(referenced in para 13 of Communication to TRIPS Council), ibid. See further elaboration in
Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial
Conference, Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), Occasional Paper 7, 8 September 2001,
at 13–15 [also published in 5 JWIP 15 (2002)], and Frederick M. Abbott, Compulsory
Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at the WTO after the Doha Declaration on
Public Health, QUNO Occasional Paper No. 9, February 2002, at 29.
61 See below text accompanying nn 87–105.
62 Para 6 of the Doha Declaration, above n 33, provides:
‘We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in
the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the
end of 2002.’
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years of further negotiations leading to the adoption of the Waiver Decision
in August 2003, followed by the adoption of the Protocol of Amendment in
December 2005. In other words, the complications that emerged in the
Waiver Decision and Amendment were the product of a decision to reject an
administratively simple solution at Doha, and to construct a new, admin-
istratively complex regime, as envisioned in provisions introduced by the EU
and the United States.63
B. Terms of the WTO measures
In the interests of conciseness, this article will not recount the step-by-step
process that ultimately produced the specific terms of the Waiver Decision.64
The key elements and issues raised by those terms are briefly discussed
subsequently.
1. Scope of covered diseases
From the outset of negotiations to address the Paragraph 6 mandate,
developing countries demanded that the solution be applied broadly to
diseases and treatments.65 The United States tried to restrict the scope of the
solution to addressing HIV-AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and a potentially
small group of other infectious diseases, while seeking to limit the countries
that would benefit from the solution.66 At a critical juncture in the nego-
tiations, the EC proposed that the solution be confined to ‘grave’ public
health problems, which raised the specter of WTO intervention to determine
when a public health problem was serious enough to warrant attention.67
These strategies proved difficult to sustain, however. There is no public
63 In fact, the bureaucratic complications which are ultimately reflected in the Amendment
largely emanated from the European Commission. Consider, for example, the proposal from
the EC to the TRIPS Council in June 2002, Communication from the European
Communities and their Member States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/352, 20 June 2002.
64 For a detailed analysis of the negotiating history of the August 30 Decision see Abbott, ‘WTO
Medicines Decision’. See also above n 27.
65 Substantive and Procedural Elements of a Report to the General Council under Paragraph 6
of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Non-Paper Submitted to the
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights by South Africa,
4 November 2002, WTO Ref: Job(02)/156. For list of supporting countries, see Abbott,
‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27, at 328–29.
66 It is worth noting that the United States initially proposed limiting permissible exporting
countries to developing countries, but this was not strongly pursued. Moreover, the United
States, like the European Union, was opposed to allowing use of the presumptively more
liberal Article 30 approach, as distinct from the presumptively more restrictive Article 31
approach. For evidence that many or most of the key restrictions in the August 30 Decision
and the Protocol of Amendment originated with, or were strongly supported by the EU, after
considerable internal deliberation in the 133 Committee of the European Council, see e.g.
MD: 494/02 REV 1, dated 29 October 2002, with interlineated suggestions from the
Commission.
67 Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health: Elements
for a compromise solution, Reprinted in Inside US Trade as Text: EU TRIPS Paper,
1 November 2002. The same EC proposal sought to require that formulation of active
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health justification for denying patients access to treatments for certain
diseases because trade officials have decided that some diseases should be on
(or off) an official list.
Developing countries remained firm in rejecting the idea of restricting the
solution to a limited scope of diseases, and their position ultimately
prevailed. In defining ‘pharmaceutical product’, both the Waiver Decision
and pending Amendment establish a broad subject matter scope of the
medicines and related supplies that may be furnished pursuant to the
system.68 The definition refers to products ‘of the pharmaceutical sector
needed to address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of
the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’.
Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration does not contain any limitation
on the application of the Declaration to specific diseases or medicines. The
definition of pharmaceutical product used in the Waiver Decision and
Amendment expressly extends to active ingredients as well as to diagnostic
kits used for determining whether pharmaceutical treatments are needed.
The definition is also broad enough to include vaccines, because vaccines are
‘products of the pharmaceutical sector’.69
2. General notification and eligible importing countries
There are at least two important forms of notification contemplated by the
Waiver Decision and Amendment. The first is a general notification of intent
to make use of the system as an importing country, which notification is
required from all countries that use the system other than LDCs.70 The
latter countries are thus already entitled to make use of the system without
more on that account. The Waiver Decision and Amendment also provide
that a WTO Member may notify the TRIPS Council that it does not intend
to use the system as an importing country, or that it intends to use it only in
a limited way.71 Practically all (if not all) OECD countries have made a
ingredients into final products was to take place in the importing Member if it maintained the
capacity for formulation. This would in some cases require territorial division of the
manufacturing process in a way that would make little sense from a cost-efficiency standpoint.
The EC further sought to require that the patent holder should always have the right to make
an offer of products at ‘strongly reduced prices’, which could be rejected on ‘reasonable
grounds’.
68 Para 1(a), Waiver Decision, above n 36; Para 2, Article 31bis, above n 37.
69 The Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal, recently opined, in response to the grant of a
compulsory license on Plavix (clopidogrel) by Thailand, that WTO compulsory licensing
rules were never intended to cover conditions such as heart disease. As noted below, members
of the European Commission have expressed similar views. Although these opinions were
offered in the context of Thailand’s use of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, and not the
August 30 Decision, they provide continuing evidence that Pharma’s advertising and lobbying
influence will seek to distort the plain language of the TRIPS Agreement and Doha
Declaration when it suits their purpose.
70 Para 1(b), Article 31bis, Annex, above n 37.
71 Ibid.
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notification of their intention not to use the system, or to use it in a limited
way, including the European Communities and each of its Member States.
A second form of notification, pertaining to use of the system in specific
transactions, is discussed subsequently.72
As regards the general notice obligation imposed on would-be importing
countries, transaction costs may be kept to a minimum by using World Bank
standard forms prepared for this purpose.73 Because no special information
is required, a generic formulation of intent should suffice. It remains, of
course, a pointless exercise, which follows from the developed countries’
strategy of loading-up the Waiver Decision and Amendment with bureau-
cratic requirements.
LDC Members are exempt from this general notification requirement,
which means that more than 30 WTO Members already are eligible to use
the system. As discussed subsequently, Rwanda has become the first WTO
Member to make notification of its specific intention to use the system.
Because Rwanda is an LDC, it was exempt from the requirement to make an
initial general notification.
Some commentators have wondered why no developing country so far
made the general notification of intent to use the system to the TRIPS
Council. Whether other governments have neglected to make notification
because of a lack of confidence in the system is difficult to assess. It would
become clearer if a country that considered using the system had rejected
such use because of potential obstacles, but the authors are not aware of any
such case.
Observers have also suggested that the failure to use the system may reflect
the developing countries’ fears of hostile criticism (or perhaps even retal-
iatory penalties) from OECD countries, as exemplified by reactions to the
recent grants of compulsory licenses by Thailand and Brazil. Industry groups
in the OECD and some media outlets have implied that these countries are
hostile to foreign direct investment because they threaten inviolable rights
in patents. They are also castigated for failing to act as full-fledged partici-
pants in globalization, and have been threatened with adverse economic
consequences.74
Whether pressure of this kind would pragmatically translate into a palpable
reduction in foreign direct investment seems a doubtful proposition at
best. Would, for example, a manufacturer of computer equipment decide
not to invest in an otherwise attractive business environment because the
host country had taken steps to protect the public health of its citizens, even
if this included the grant of a compulsory license? That same company
might just as well view measures taken for the protection of public health as
72 See below text accompanying nn 97–8.
73 See World Bank Models, above n 49.
74 See below, text accompanying nn 146–58.
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a positive inducement, in part because company health expenditures might
be lowered.
Nevertheless, in requiring eligible importing countries to deposit a
general notification of intent to use, opponents of the system may in fact
have imposed a political barrier that limits its usefulness. In this connection,
we note that in 2001 US authorities threatened to issue compulsory licenses
with regard to stockpiling Cipro for an anthrax scare. Health and Human
Services Secretary Michael Leavitt did much the same thing regarding access
to Tamiflu.75 We also note that France and Belgium have recently enacted
statutes permitting accelerated compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals
when needed. While their official positions hostile to compulsory licensing
thus seem intended to inhibit action by foreign governments, they are not
actually considered to constrain either the EU or the United States.76
3. Determination as to insufficient or no capacity
In order to be eligible to import medicines in a given case, under Article
31bis, a country must either (1) be an LDC, or (2) make a determination
that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the product in
question.77 The determination regarding capacity, which is made by the
importing country, excludes production facilities that the patent holder owns
or controls. It applies to the specific product in question, and not generally
to the country’s pharmaceutical industry.78 Once the importing Member
has developed its own adequate capacity, it is expected to cease use of the
system.
This requirement imposes no significant burden on a prospective
importing Member. When there is adequate domestic capacity to produce
the product in a way that would reasonably satisfy the country’s needs, there
is no reason to obtain supplies elsewhere. Developing WTO Members suc-
ceeded on this issue, despite a proposal to divide the API and formulation
markets (which might have created significant inefficiencies).79
75 US Representative Joe Barton (R-Tx) Holds a Hearing on Pandemic Flu Preparedness,
House Energy And Commerce Committee, FDCH Political Transcripts, 8 November 2005,
(exchange between HHS Sec’y Michael Leavitt and Representative Tom Allen), Lexis-Nexis
News database. Roche agreed to increase its manufacturing of Tamiflu within the United
States at the insistence of Health and Human Services following studies indicating that
foreign sources of supply would be unreliable in a crisis. See also Roche Press Release, infra
n. 125.
76 In fact, the United States makes greater routine use of compulsory licensing of patent
inventions for a variety of government purposes than most other countries combined. See
generally, Jerome H. Reichman with Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented
Inventions: The Law and Practice of the United States, (Part III) (ICTSD/UNCTAD 2003)
(citing authorities).
77 Para 2(a)(ii), Article 31bis, Annex, and Appendix to Annex, above n 37.
78 Ibid.
79 See above n 67. The ‘Chairperson’s Statement’, discussed below, text accompanying nn 113–
15, indicates that ‘To promote transparency and avoid controversy, notifications under
paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the Decision would include information on how the Member in question
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4. Licensing and conditions
The procedural and substantive requirements that govern the issuance
of compulsory licenses by importing (where applicable) and exporting
countries, as well as the conditions and notifications connected with that
licensing, constitute the principal potential obstacles to effective use of the
Amendment.
(a) Importing Members An importing member need not issue a domestic
compulsory license when there is no applicable patent. Because LDCs are
authorized to ignore or suspend patent protection,80 they too need not issue
domestic compulsory licenses if they choose to produce or import medicines
otherwise covered by patents. An importing member that is not exempt (per
the above) must issue a compulsory license prior to importation, and it must
notify the TRIPS Council of its intent to issue (or its issuance of) the
license.81
Although compulsory licensing may entail a number of administrative
complications, there are legitimate ways to avoid a substantial part of them.
For example, a license issued for public noncommercial use or for national
emergency or circumstance of extreme urgency does not require prior nego-
tiation with, or even notification of, the patent holder (pursuant to Article
31(b), TRIPS Agreement, which applies to the Amendment procedure).82
Only in the case where a party is seeking a compulsory license for ordinary
commercial use do the requirements of prior negotiation with the patent
holder and prior notification apply. It therefore becomes legally possible to
ensure that action on the importing side (as well as on the exporting side)
occurs in an expeditious manner.
It is worth noting that action to remedy anticompetitive practices also
obviates both the need for prior negotiation with the patentee and the limits
on exports under Article 31(f),83 which would otherwise require recourse
to the Amendment. However, actions to correct anticompetitive practices
require some judicial or administrative process,84 which takes time. Once the
process is completed, the prosecuting government is also freed from the duty
to provide adequate remuneration and may, instead, penalize the patentee
had established, in accordance with the Annex, that it has insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.’ Irrespective of the legal status of the Chairperson’s
Statement, this adds nothing material to the Amendment. A statement that the importing
country had examined relevant available data would suffice.
80 See Para 2(a)(iii) and n 6, Waiver Decision, above n 36, and World Bank Models, above n 49,
at 19–21.
81 See Para 2(a)(iii), Waiver Decision, above n 36.
82 See e.g. para 2(a)(iii), ibid, for continued applicability of Article 31, except as otherwise
amended. In addition, the possibility for injunctive relief need not be available with respect to
government use.
83 TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, Article 31(k).
84 Ibid.
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for its conduct.85 In this connection, the Italian Competition Commission
has recently issued three compulsory licenses against major pharmaceutical
companies for refusals to deal, and it has imposed royalty-free licenses
to boot.86
Under amended Article 31bis, the importing Member must specify the
name of the product(s) and the expected quantities to be imported, and
make notification of that to the TRIPS Council.87 While some commentary
has suggested that this requirement inhibits effective use of the system,88 it is
not necessarily true. The Amendment does not demand a particular fixed
formula, and there are a several ways to express a relatively subjective
indication (e.g. the quantity needed to treat an approximate sized group of
patients over an approximate period of time). Nothing in the Amendment
prevents a Member from modifying the quantity over time as needs change
or become clearer.89 While it would have been simpler to avoid a statement
of expected quantity, this requirement, standing alone, does not necessarily
constitute a significant obstacle.
Also criticized is the provision requiring prospective suppliers in exporting
Members to produce on a case-by-case, license-by-license basis.90 Prospec-
tive exporters accordingly find it harder to make decisions and investments
necessary to scale-up production due to the uncertain size of import markets.
This issue will be further addressed in the context of the requirements
imposed on exporting Members. Nevertheless, so long as ‘predominant’
exports are considered a form of ‘exception’ under Article 31(f) that requires
specific procedural attention, investment planning may remain problematic
unless action to pool compulsory licenses in appropriate procurement
cases—as explained subsequently—suffices to address the problem.91
In July 2007, Rwanda, an LDC, became the first country to submit notice
of intent to use the system in order to import specific ARV drugs from
Canada.92 Rwanda relied on World Bank model forms in making this noti-
fication. Rwanda’s has thus invoked Canada’s administratively complex
85 Ibid. See generally, Thomas Cottier, ‘The Doha Waiver and Its Effects on the Nature of the
TRIPS System and on Competition Law—The Impact of Human Rights’, in Intellectual
Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, I. Govaere and H. Ullrich (eds), College of
Europe Studies, No. 61, 2006, 173, 196–8 (viewing Waiver Decision as substitute for
undeveloped competition law and policies in poor countries).
86 See e.g. Press Release, Pharmaceuticals: Antitrust Authority Rules Merck Must Grant Free
Licences For The Active Ingredient Finasteride, A364 - Merck - Active Ingredients
(Conclusion of Investigation), http://www.agcm.it/agcm_eng/COSTAMPA/E_PRESS.NSF/
92e82eb9012a8bc6c125652a00287fbd/28653 b373e56772ac12572ab003a4d68
87 Para 2(a)(i), Article 31bis, Annex, above n 37.
88 See e.g. MSF Access to Medicines Campaign, Neither Expeditious, Nor a Solution, above n 41,
at 4.
89 See e.g. World Bank Models, above n 49, at 23–24.
90 See e.g. MSF Access to Medicines Campaign, Neither Expeditious, Nor a Solution, above n 41,
at 4.
91 See below section ‘Making the Amendment System Work’.
92 See Rwanda notification, above n 53; see also World Bank Models, above n 49, at 19–20.
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implementing legislation, which entails requirements in addition to those
imposed by the Waiver Decision.93
(b) Exporting Members Under the proposed Amendment (as under the
Waiver), an exporting Member is also required to issue a compulsory license
subject to conditions.94 The authorized manufacturer should only export the
quantities needed (and notified) by the importing Member(s).95 Product
should be clearly identified as having been produced under this system,
which may entail special packaging and/or labeling, and/or special shaping or
coloring, if the distinctions are feasible and do not significantly affect price.96
The exporting licensee is required to post destination and identification
information regarding shipments on a web site,97 and it must also notify the
TRIPS Council of the issuance of the license and its conditions, including
the expected quantities of production and destination(s).98
As with respect to the importing Member, a compulsory license issued by
the exporting Member for public noncommercial use or for national
emergency or circumstance of extreme urgency does not require prior
negotiation with, or notification of, the patent holder.99 Thus, under the
circumstances envisioned by Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, a
compulsory licensing transaction may be pursued expeditiously through
back-to-back licenses that take advantage of ‘fast-track’ possibilities.100
However, one developed country government has expressed the view that
an emergency in the importing country would not justify ‘fast track’ pro-
cedures in the exporting country.101 While this paradoxical position has been
93 Canadian Access to Medicines Regime, Ch 23, Statutes of Canada (2004).
94 Para 2(b), Article 31bis, Annex, above n 37.
95 Para 2(b)(i), Ibid.
96 Para 2(b)(ii), Ibid. This provision is also addressed in the Chairperson Statement, below
nn 113–115. Irrespective of the legal status of the Chairperson Statement, it is unlikely to
affect this aspect of the Amendment.
97 Para 2(b)(iii), Article 31bis, Annex, above n 37.
98 Para 2(c), Ibid.
99 See e.g. para 2(a)(iii), Ibid (specifying continued applicability of Article 31, except as
otherwise amended).
100 The ‘fast-track’ terminology in this regard was initially adopted by a European Commission
negotiating team and used in an article on the Waiver Decision published subsequent to its
adoption. See Paul Vandoren and Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, ‘The WTO Decision on
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Making
It Work’, 6 J World Intell Prop L 779, 783 (2003) (stating that under Article 31 ‘procedures
to grant compulsory licenses are not necessarily cumbersome and lengthy’ but, rather,
‘minimal and flexible’).
101 See Abbott, ‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27, at 342, for earlier reference to this
Canadian position. The position was reiterated, and attributed to the Ministry of Justice, at a
public meeting on review of Canada’s legislation held in Ottawa on 19–21 April 2007
(author’s notes). It is self-evident that the entire object and purpose of negotiation of the
Waiver and Amendment was to allow an exporting Member to make use of the ‘fast-track’
procedure to address a situation of emergency, extreme urgency or public noncommercial
use in the eligible importing Member. The whole process is designed to meet the public
health needs of the importing country that lacks manufacturing capacity.
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rejected by other governments in their implementing legislation, it may
undermine the extent to which developing country governments believe they
can rely on the good faith of negotiators at the WTO.
As a general matter, compiling the information required by the TRIPS
Council concerning the grant of a compulsory license should not unduly
burden the exporting Member. Reputable pharmaceutical producers gen-
erate detailed production and shipping records in the ordinary course of
business, and posting such information on the Internet should be a minor
matter. Although there might be some cases where specially identifying
a product could impose difficulties, in the ordinary case finished product
packaging is relatively easy to modify, and identification through such
modifications or labeling should be acceptable under the terms of the
Amendment.102
A potentially more serious obstacle for the prospective exporter is the
requirement to produce only amounts needed to satisfy the requirements
of licensees or other importers (e.g. LDCs operating under an exemption) as
notified to the TRIPS Council. Prospective producers in exporting countries
may thus refrain from constructing new facilities ‘on speculation’ that
a sufficient number of orders will be received in the end. However,
this outcome is consistent with respect for the rights of patent holders under
the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.
Other factors may ameliorate this potential problem. As with any
production venture, the plant owner may visit prospective purchasers prior
to undertaking capital expenditure, to obtain indications of intention to
purchase and/or commitments. The recipient of a compulsory license under
this system is not precluded from also obtaining a license for supply of
its domestic market. Existing pharmaceutical production facilities may in
some cases be modified to produce different drugs, without need to build a
new facility, in which case, the transition costs may be modest. For example,
a producer in India, Brazil or elsewhere might initiate relatively small-scale
production under either a commercial license or a compulsory license for
supply of the domestic market, and later solicit orders that would require it
to make use of the Amendment. The costs of ramping up production in such
cases may be lower than start-up costs from scratch.
Above all, pooled procurement strategies may be used by countries
or groups of countries with long-term needs that can be identified in
advance, which may facilitate long-term planning for potential exporters.
For example, a group of countries in the Caribbean may decide that they
have a long-term need for second- or third-line ARV treatments and
they could jointly contract for purchase from an Indian or Brazilian supplier.
102 The language of the Amendment suggests that a producer should not be required to
purchase new formulation or stamping equipment solely for this purpose, but might make
some adjustments to existing production processes.
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This approach will be more fully developed in connection with our
discussion of Regional Supply Centers subsequently.103
5. Remuneration
One potential consequence of the issuance of double compulsory licenses in
the importing and exporting Members was that the remuneration provided
for under Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement might have to be paid
twice. The Amendment avoids this outcome by providing that adequate
remuneration need only be paid in the country of export, taking into account
the economic circumstances of the importing country.104 This reasonable
solution to the remuneration issue should not likely lead to difficulties.
6. Measures to prevent diversion and non-authorized importation
The Amendment obligates importing Members to take reasonable and
proportionate measures to prevent diversion or re-exportation of pharma-
ceutical products received under the system.105 There is provision for poten-
tial assistance from developed to developing Members in implementing
an anti-diversion system, if requested. This provision, which is directed
to governments, need not materially inhibit use of the system or impose
unreasonable costs. Drug importation should ordinarily be subject to close
supply chain management, and steps taken to ensure the integrity of supply
are likely to prove useful from a public health perspective as well.
The Amendment also requires Members to enable patent holders to
protect against unauthorized importation of products manufactured under
the system and diverted into their markets.106 However, Members are not
required to establish mechanisms for this purpose beyond those already
available under the TRIPS Agreement.107 Implicit in this scheme is an
understanding that medicines produced under the relevant compulsory
licenses should not be treated as ‘lawful parallel imports’ after having initially
been placed on the market. This result follows logically from the design of
the system, which limits exports to the intended destination (although
another approach to re-exports might reasonably have been pursued).
7. Special regional treatment
The Amendment makes special provision for Members that belong to
regional trade agreements of which at least half the members ‘currently’ are
LDCs.108 This provision permits pharmaceutical products imported into
one Member of the eligible group under a compulsory license to be
103 See below section ‘Making the Amendment System Work’.
104 Para 2, Article 31bis.
105 Para 3, Ibid.
106 Para 4, Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Para 3, Article 31bis.
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re-exported to other Members of the group without additional export
licensing. However, it does not exempt the importing countries from issuing
separate compulsory licenses where otherwise applicable109 (i.e. when there
is a patent or, in the case of an LDC, when it has not elected to disapply
the patent). There is also some provision for developed country assistance
in establishing systems for the grant of regional patents to facilitate use of
this concession.
Nonetheless, this provision for special treatment of a regional alliance
remains severely restricted. The EU, which was instrumental in imposing
these limitations during the negotiations, insisted that the solution should
be limited to what is effectively sub-Saharan Africa. It rejected proposals
that would have made it unnecessary for importing countries to issue
compulsory licenses when re-exportation had otherwise been enabled.110
8. Non-violation causes of action
The Amendment expressly precludes nonviolation nullification or impair-
ment causes of action, and situation causes of action, from being initiated
in dispute settlement proceedings related to the Amendment.111
This prohibition is important because the general situation regarding non-
violation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement remains uncertain, and
the possibility of such complaints might have created substantial insecurity
for countries inclined to use the system.112
9. The Chairperson’s Statement
When, after protracted negotiations, efforts to limit the ‘scope of diseases’
covered by the Waiver Decision failed,113 a face-saving formula was devised
to enable the United States to sign off on it. This formula ultimately resulted
in a statement read out by the Chair of the General Council prior to adop-
tion of the Waiver Decision on 30 August 2003, and again prior to adoption
of the Protocol on 6 December 2005 (the Chairperson’s Statement).
As a practical matter, the only controversial provision of the Chairperson’s
Statement is the shared understanding that:
First, Members recognize that the system that will be established by
the Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health and,
without prejudice to paragraph 3 of Article 31bis of the amendment
109 For suggestions about pooling such licenses, see below text accompanying nn 232–41.
110 The provision for assistance in regional patenting was viewed by developing country
negotiators as part of an EU strategy for making it easier for EU pharmaceutical companies
to control the market.
111 Para 4, Article 31bis.
112 See e.g. UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book, above n 1, at 668 ff.
113 See above text accompanying nn 65–9. For details, including US statement to TRIPS
Council, see Abbott, ‘WTO Medicines Decision’, above n 27, at 331.
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[or paragraph 6 of the Waiver Decision], not be an instrument to pursue
industrial or commercial policy objectives.114
The United States had initially proposed that use of the Waiver Decision
should ‘not [be] for commercial gain,’ but developing country negotiators
promptly rejected this proposal. The final formula indicates that the
intention of the system is to support public health needs, and not primarily
to advance industrial policy objectives. We do not expect this statement to
inhibit use of the system, whatever its legal status may turn out to be.115 It
seems unlikely that any WTO Member issuing a compulsory license for
export of a pharmaceutical product to assist needy countries that lacked
manufacturing capacity of their own would be failing to advance public
health objectives, even though the exporting country may benefit from the
venture.
10. Technology transfer
The Amendment recognizes the desirability of improving pharmaceutical
production capacity in countries with insufficient or no capacity, and it
encourages Members to ‘use the system in the way which would promote
this objective’.116 It also includes an ‘undertaking’ by Members to address
this problem within the framework of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement,
and related commitments to LDCs.117
The German government, in association with United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UK Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID), is undertaking a program to improve
production capacity in certain LDCs of Africa and elsewhere, which repre-
sents an example of positive implementation of this undertaking. The United
States has also provided funding for the study of transfer of technology
options for the pharmaceutical sector in Latin America, one of which studies
was undertaken by an author of this article.118
These initiatives suggest that there are concrete mechanisms by which
technologically advanced countries might support the improvement of
pharmaceutical research, development and production capacity in developing
114 Text of Chairperson’s Statement is available at http://www/wto.org.
115 Nonetheless, there is considerable controversy concerning the legal status of the
Chairperson’s Statement.
116 Para 6, Article 31bis, Annex, above n 37.
117 TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, Article 61.2, requires developed country members to ‘provide
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and
encouraging technology transfer’, to LDCs, so that the latter ‘may create a sound and viable
technological base’.
118 Frederick Abbott has served as technical expert for a project funded by USAID regarding
transfer of technology in the pharmaceutical sector with respect to Colombia, which project
has also involved extensive consultations in Brazil. Such projects are over and above the
requirements of Article 66.2, which addresses LDCs.
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countries. Yet, very limited financial resources have so far been committed
to such endeavors, and it is not clear that developed country governments
are genuinely prepared to promote capacity-building objectives of this kind.
11. Implementing regulations
Given the deliberate limitations built into the pending Amendment, the
ratification process immediately poses the question whether, from a public
health standpoint, it can and will be implemented in a manner that enables
countries without adequate production capacity to make effective use of
compulsory licensing. How potential exporting countries resolve internal
tensions between their research-based pharmaceutical industries and their
generic producers will affect the end result.
For example, the initial proposal for an implementing Regulation from the
European Commission contained a number of restrictions and limitations
that would have substantially inhibited effective use of the Waiver Decision
and Amendment. Among the most important deficiencies, that proposal
did not acknowledge the possibility of using the fast-track procedure.119
Notwithstanding this problematic initial response, and through successful
intervention by the European Parliament,120 the EU ultimately adopted an
implementing Regulation that appears to successfully incorporate most of the
flexibilities available to WTO Members in making use of the Waiver
Decision.121
12. Tentative evaluation of the pending enactments
One of the common criticisms directed at the Waiver Decision (and Amend-
ment) is that, until July 2007, its legal machinery had not been used despite
its provisional adoption in August 2003. It seems logical to follow that
119 See e.g. European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, Report on the Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on compulsory licensing of
patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with
public health problems [(Com (2004)] 0737-C60168/2004-2004/0258 (COD), A6-0242/
2005, at 7 [hereinafter EP Committee on International Trade, Report (2005)] (recom-
mending that the Community should ‘encourage . . . the transfer of technology, research,
capacity strengthening regional supply systems and help with registration in order to
facilitate and increase the production of pharmaceutical products by the developing countries
themselves’.).
120 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on compulsory
licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to
countries with public health problems, Brussels, COM(2004) 737 final, 29 October 2004.
See also Carlos M. Correa, Policy Paper, Assessment of the Proposed EU Regulation on the
Compulsory Licensing of Generic Drugs for Export to Developing Countries, Policy
Department, European Parliament, EP/ExPol/2004/07 01/02/2005.
121 Regulation (EC) No 816/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May
2006 on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical
products for export to countries with public health problems, OJ L 157/1, 9 June 2006,
available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum
=COD/2004/0258>. For a detailed explanation of the flexibilities in the EU Regulation,
see Abbott and Reichman Study, above n 43 at 19–21.
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because the Waiver Decision has seldom been used, it must be ineffective.
We believe this particular line of criticism to be both premature and uncon-
vincing. Nor should one conclude that these instruments have failed to play a
significant role in influencing access to essential medicines.
In 2005, as worldwide concerns about the spread of a deadly form of avian
flu increased, Taiwan announced that it would issue a compulsory license for
the local production of Roche’s patented Tamiflu (oseltamivir) antiviral.122
Following expressions of concern by other countries regarding potential
limits on the availability of Tamiflu from Roche, the Swiss pharmaceutical
company issued voluntary licenses to a number of producers that permitted
stockpiles to be increased,123 including producers in China (two suppliers),
India and South Africa.124 Although Roche was said to have entered into
voluntary licensing agreements with US generic manufacturers to increase
production under pressure from members of Congress,125 Roche itself
reports that it stepped up its own controlled production in the United States
at the request of the Department of Health and Human Services.126
Roche’s actions with respect to the supply of Tamiflu were taken in the
shadow of the Waiver Decision and Amendment, which would have per-
mitted the export of its product under compulsory license to countries
without adequate manufacturing capacity. A producer acting under com-
pulsory license in Taiwan, China or India could fill orders from developing
countries around the world (most developed countries have opted out of
the Amendment-based system). Compulsory licensing has traditionally
served as an effective threat against which price reductions or voluntary
122 Kathrin Hille, Taiwan employs compulsory licensing for Tamiflu, FT.com, 25 November
2005. The report notes that Taiwan issued a domestic license with a number of limitations.
However, its decision appeared to trigger announcements by other countries of plans to issue
compulsory licenses, suggesting an incipient global movement to override the Roche patent,
which might well have included export–import arrangements.
123 Roche Media News, Roche update on Tamiflu global supply to meet future world
demands—from partnerships to regional sub-licenses, Basel, 12 December 2005 (reporting
voluntary license to Shanghai Pharmaceutical Group, and identification of twelve potential
sub-licensees); Roche, Factsheet Tamiful, 17 November 2006, at http://www.roche.com/
med_mbtamiflu05e.pdf.
124 The Chinese license was reportedly issued under threat of compulsory license. See James
Packard Love, Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory Licensing on Patents, KEI
Research Note 2007 (2), revised as of 6 May 2007, available at http://www.keionline.org/
misc-docs/recent_cls.pdf.
125 See e.g. California State Senate Health Committee Staff Analysis of Senate Bill 1763, April
2006, noting that, on 26 October 2005, 10 members of Congress sent a letter to Health and
Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt stating that compromising public health needs to
protect patent rights is ‘inexcusable’ ‘and requesting the immediate issuance of compulsory
licenses for Tamiflu and Relenza so that generic manufacturers could begin producing
necessary drugs to meet stockpile goals. In December of 2005, Roche reached a voluntary
agreement with two US generic drug companies to increase production of Tamiflu.’ See
<http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_17511800/sb_1763_cfa_20060424_152009_
sen_comm.html>.
126 Roche recorded conference call MP3 file, 26 April 2007, from http://www.roche.com/home/
media/med_events/med_events_mb0407.htm.
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licenses may be negotiated,127 and it seems likely that the Waiver Decision
played that role in the case of Tamiflu.
Even if one discounts the role of the Waiver Decision in this instance,
it remains unsurprising that its framework has only just begun to be used.
The factual premise underlying negotiation of the Waiver Decision and
Amendment was the transition to take place in India on 1 January 2005.
After that date, pharmaceutical mailbox patent applications would be pro-
cessed,128 and new pharmaceutical products would become subject to
patenting. While a resulting curtailment of generic supplies to world markets
from India was anticipated, it could not be, and was not, immediate.
Even though Indian patent offices must process the mailbox applications,
progress has been slow. Moreover, India’s Patent Act amendments permit
generic producers to continue supplying medicines already in production on
1 January 2005, upon payment of a reasonable royalty, and Glaxo decided
against pursuing its Indian patent application for Combivir.129 As a result,
Indian generic production and supply to world markets has yet to be
curtailed.
While use of the system established by the Amendment could have been
undertaken in other prospective exporting countries, or for other reasons,
its slow start does not support the conclusion that it is unimportant.
As countries face the growing need to supply second- and third-line ARV
treatments, which are and will be patented in the principal countries of
potential supply, such as China and India, demand for generic products
should become intense. In that context, governments may well be prepared
to overcome political inhibitions and seek to make use of the system.
The recent issuance by Brazil and Thailand of compulsory licenses on
Merck’s patented Efavirenz drug evidences the growing pressures on public
health budgets.
C. The grants of compulsory licenses in Brazil and Thailand
Recent grants of compulsory licenses in two middle-income developing
countries have riveted attention on this legal device and heated up the
political atmosphere, which indirectly affects the prospects for implementa-
tion of the pending Amendment. A brief survey of these developments is set
out subsequently.
Let us clarify that the Waiver Decision did not apply to the government
use licenses issued by Brazil and Thailand, nor would the Amendment have
127 See Reichman with Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licenses of Patented Inventions, above n 34 See
also Cottier, The Doha Waiver, above n 85 (finding that ‘the Waiver and Amendment have
made an impact as one among many other factors’.).
128 See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, above n 27, at 320–3.
129 The Patents Act of 1970 (India), as amended 2005, section 11A(7). See GlaxoSmithKline
Press Release, 10 August 2006, GSK patents and patent applications for Combivir, http://
www.gsk.com/ControllerServlet?appId=4&pageId=402&newsid=874.
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applied (if and when it enters into force), at least as matters now stand with
respect to foreign requests for supply. Neither Brazil nor Thailand issued its
license for the purpose of exporting a predominant part of production to
a country or countries without adequate pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity, which is the situation covered by the WTO’s legislation under
review.
These licenses were instead issued within the legal framework established
by Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, and reaffirmed by the Doha Declar-
ation, in a manner legally consistent with that framework. Nonetheless, the
public health circumstances surrounding the issuance of these licenses, as
well as the ensuing political reactions, are relevant to an assessment of the
potential benefits of the Amendment.
1. The case of Brazil
Few countries in the world—and certainly among developing countries—
have devoted more attention to the problem of ensuring access to medicines
than Brazil, and there is a comprehensive academic literature describing in
detail the steps the Brazilian government and research institutions have taken
to this end.130 To be clear, prior governments had been criticized for
legislation favoring multinationals over the domestic industry, which created
serious problems. A number of steps now being taken in Brazil are designed
to rebalance the situation, so as to enhance local participation in more
innovative parts of the pharmaceutical sector.
Prior to entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement on 1 January 1995
(which Brazil had strongly opposed), its domestic industry had produced a
significant part of the APIs used in products sold on the domestic market.
Because Brazil did not provide pharmaceutical product patent protection at
that time, it could have taken advantage of the same ten-year transition
period that India had invoked.131 However, in a decision strongly criticized
by Brazilian public health experts, the government chose not only to provide
pharmaceutical product patent protection from 1996 on, but also to
voluntarily afford ‘pipeline’ measures that permitted the extension of
patent protection beyond what would ordinarily have been available to
holders of foreign patents.132
130 See e.g. Intellectual Property in the Context of the WTO TRIPS Agreement: Challenges for Public
Health, J. Bermudez and M.A. Oliveria (eds) (2004), Chs 7–9; Claudia Ines Chamas,
Developing Innovative Capacity in Brazil to Meet Health Needs, MIHR Report to CIPIH, April
2005, WHO Ref. CIPIH Study 10d (DGR); O. Fabienne, D. Cristina, L. Hasenclever and
C. Benjamin, TRIPS-Post 2005 in Southern Countries: The Sustainability of Public Health
Policies at Stake, DIME Conference, London, September 2006, and Luciana Xavier de
Lemos Capanema, A Indu´stria Farmaceˆutica Brasiliera e a Atuac¸a˜o do BNDES, 23 BNDES
Setorial 193 (2006). Data regarding Brazil’s pre-TRIPS APIs production is in Chamas, ibid.,
at 81–82.
131 TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, Article 65.4.
132 Provided that their products had not been previously introduced on the Brazilian market.
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As a consequence of these decisions, between 1996 and 2005, Brazil lost
almost all of its API production capacity, although not the basic technology
that might be needed to reestablish it. Today, virtually all APIs used in
the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector are imported, and there has been a
staggering, disproportionate increase, in Brazilian expenditures on imports of
pharmaceutical products.
At the same time, Brazil led the world in establishing universal public
access to ARV treatment for HIV-AIDS. As part of a comprehensive strategy,
Brazil relied on a system of public manufacturing facilities to produce rea-
sonably affordable ARV treatments that were not covered by patents.
However, several important ARVs, particularly those used as second-line
treatment (i.e. when resistance to first-line treatment develops) were sub-
sequently patented in Brazil by foreign multinational producers, and these
drugs could not be produced locally without infringing those patents.
The cost to the Brazilian public health sector of purchasing the patented
ARVs far exceeds the cost of purchasing locally produced (or imported)
generic ARVs, and it imposes a significant burden on the public health
budget. Because resistance to first-line ARVs among the group of patients
treated in Brazil will increase over time, and because side-effect profiles of
newer generation ARVs may be better than first-line alternatives, reliance on
newer treatments seems likely to increase, with corresponding pressure on
the public health expenditures.
For these reasons, the Brazilian government has used the threat of
compulsory licensing to pressure foreign multinational patent holders to
significantly lower the prices charged for ARVs. Up until April 2007, Brazil
had not formally issued a compulsory license because the government
reached negotiated settlements with foreign suppliers in every case.133
However, in April 2007, the Brazilian government134 decided to grant a
compulsory license for public use of Merck’s135 Brazilian patent on the ARV
Efavirenz.136 This ARV is used in the treatment of approximately 75,000 of
133 The decision to pursue voluntary settlements had been criticized by important actors in the
Brazilian public health sector because (i) in some cases, the results were perceived as too
favorable to the foreign supplier and too restrictive on Brazilian public health authorities, and
(ii) because the failure to initiate production in Brazil limits the learning experience and
capacity of public and private pharmaceutical producers. In the end, reliance on foreign
patent-holding suppliers continues at the present time.
134 See Q&A from the Brazilian Ministry of Health on the Efavirenz CL—official translation
from the Ministry of Health available on www.aids.gov.br, posted on IP-Health List Serve,
26 April 2007.
135 In Brazil, through its affiliate ‘Merck Sharp and Dohme’. Ibid.
136 ‘Efavirenz is in the class of drugs called non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors
(NNRTIs), which helps keep the AIDS virus from reproducing in cells. This antiretroviral
drug is used in combination with other antiretroviral agents for the treatment of HIV-1
infection.’ US Food and Drug Administration, FDA Tentatively Approves Generic
Efavirenz—Product Eligible To Be Considered Under the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief, FDA News, 24 June 2005.
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the 200,000 patients under treatment in Brazil.137 Although Merck had
offered to lower the annual per patient price of its drug from $580 to $400,
there were generic versions available from India at $165 per patient per year.
Brazil estimates a cost-saving of $30 million per year to its public health
procurement budget from shifting to generic imports.138
Brazil’s national pharmaceutical laboratory and producers also plan to
transition to local production.139 In this connection, we note that the US
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) authorizes the
purchase of generic Efavirenz from at least one Indian supplier (Aurobindo).
The latest report from PEPFAR explains the substantial cost-saving the US
government is achieving in its treatment program through a shift from
originator to generic ARVs (including Efavirenz).140
2. The case of Thailand
Thailand covers a large part of its population with universal access to
medicines through publicly funded government organizations, which provide
universal access to HIV-AIDS treatment.141 Since the entry into force of the
TRIPS Agreement, Thailand’s budgetary expenditures for the provision of
medicines have increased dramatically and now constitute approximately
10% of the total government budget.
From November through February 2007, the government of Thailand
issued compulsory (‘government use’) licenses on three patented pharma-
ceutical products.142 Two of these were ARV treatments: (i) Kaletra
(Lopinavir and Ritonavir) (patented in Thailand by Abbott Laboratories)
and (ii) Efavirenz (patented in Thailand by Merck). The third was Plavix
(clopidogrel), a product used for the treatment of coronary disease, patented
in Thailand by Sanofi-Aventis. The licenses will initially be used for the
importation of generic products from India, but the government production
facility (GPO) plans to initiate local production in the future.
Although the government initially proposed payment of a royalty of 0.5%
to the patent holders, it has indicated (and provided in legislation) that this
137 See Brazil MoH, above n 134, and Joe Cohen, ‘Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma
Patents’, Science Mag, 11 May 2007, at 816.
138 See above n 137.
139 Marcia Wonghon, ‘Brazil Decides to Make Own AIDS Drug After Talks With Merck
Collapse’, Brazil Mag, 3 May 2007, available at http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/
8220/54/.
140 See e.g. PEPFAR, Critical Intervention in the Focus Countries: Treatment, at, e.g. Tables
2.8 and 2.9, referring, inter alia, to generic versions of Efavirenz, http://www.pepfar.gov/
documents/organization/81024.pdf.
141 A comprehensive description of Thailand’s public health approach to the provision of
medicines can be found at Ministry of Public Health and National Health Security Office,
Thailand, Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burning Issues Related to the Government Use of
Patents on Three Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand, February 2007, ISBN 978-974-
94591-5-7 [hereinafter the ‘Thai White Paper’].
142 Documents evidencing the grants of the compulsory license are attached to the Thai White
Paper, above n 141.
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rate remains open to further negotiation and review. The Thai government
did not attempt to negotiate voluntary licenses with the patent holders
immediately prior to issuing these licenses, but it had previously and
unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate price reductions from suppliers over a
prolonged period of time.
When the government issued its public use license for Efavirenz, Merck’s
price was approximately double that of the Indian generic price. Merck later
offered to reduce its price for Efavirenz to about 20% above the Indian
generic price.143 The Thai authorities expect to reduce the price of pur-
chasing Kaletra to about 20% of Abbott Laboratories’ current price. The
government initially indicated that it expected to reduce its costs for
clopidogrel (Plavix) by a factor of 10.144
The authorities stress that the ‘government use’ licenses issued for its
public health sector will not be used to supply the comparatively small
segment of the ‘private’ commercial pharmaceuticals market, where products
are sold at the patentee’s prices. Spokesmen for the Health Ministry have
publicly declared at several conferences that their goal was to move the
pharmaceutical companies from a ‘low volume–high margin’ pricing strategy
to a ‘high volume–low margin’ alternative approach.
Because Thailand contracted for several months supply of Efavirenz from
an Indian generic supplier, the government has not yet considered it nec-
essary to make a decision regarding future purchases from Merck at its
reduced offer price. While the authorities continued to hold discussions with
Abbott Laboratories and Sanofi-Aventis, it was reported on 21 August 2007,
that the Ministry of Public Health had placed an order with an Indian
generic producer for two million clopidogrel tablets at a price of 1.01 Baht/
tablet, as compared with a price of 70 Baht/tablet paid for Plavix.145
Meanwhile, Abbott Laboratories has withdrawn a number of applications
for regulatory approval of drugs that were pending at the time the govern-
ment use license on Kaletra was issued.
3. Foreign reaction
The multinational pharmaceutical companies affected by the Brazil and
Thailand compulsory licensing decisions claim that these decisions will have
a negative effect on research and development for new medicines and have
strongly condemned them.146 Pharmaceutical industry groups, and more
143 Ibid, at 29 and Document 21 (Merck Press Release).
144 Thai White Paper, above n 141, at 14–15.
145 Theerawut Sathitphattarakul and Apiradee Treerutkuarkul, ‘Govt buys heart drug from
India’, Bangkok Post, 23 August 2007.
146 See e.g. Nicholas Zamiska, ‘Abbott Escalates Thai Patent Rift, Firm Pulls Plans to Offer
New Drugs in Spat with Regime’, Wall St J, 14 March 2007; Merck & Co, Inc. Statement
on Brazilian Government’s Decision To Issue Compulsory License for STOCRINTM,
4 May 2007, available at <http://http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/
2007_0504.html.
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broadly based industry chambers of commerce, have likewise criticized these
developments.147 On 1 September 2007, it was reported that Sanofi-Aventis,
holder of the Thai patent on clopidogrel/Plavix, had threatened to sue
Emcure Pharmaceuticals, the Indian company that was awarded a purchase
contract by the Thai Ministry of Public Health, if it imported generic
clopidogrel into Thailand.148
At least in the case of Thailand, the reaction by US government
authorities was initially somewhat conciliatory. United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab assured a substantial number of
concerned members of Congress that the actions taken by the government of
Thailand appeared to fall within WTO rules, and that USTR was not
directly involved in addressing this situation. Nevertheless, USTR placed
Thailand under 2007 Special 301 ‘Priority Watch List’ surveillance, stating:
[I]n Thailand, in late 2006 and early 2007, there were further indications of a
weakening of respect for patents, as the Thai Government announced
decisions to issue compulsory licenses for several patented pharmaceutical
products. While the United States acknowledges a country’s ability to issue
such licenses in accordance with WTO rules, the lack of transparency
and due process exhibited in Thailand represents a serious concern.
These actions have compounded previously expressed concerns such as
delay in the granting of patents and weak protection against unfair
commercial use for data generated to obtain marketing approval.149
It should be noted that Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding obliges Members to seek redress for alleged violations of the
WTO Agreement through specified multilateral venues and procedures.150
Though perhaps slower off the mark than USTR, the European Commission
launched a high-pressure campaign aimed at the Thai government on behalf
of Sanofi-Aventis with a letter dated 10 July 2007, from Trade Commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson to Thailand’s Minister of Commerce, Krirk-krai
Jirapaet.151 This letter was written just as the European Parliament was
debating whether to ratify the Amendment, and after it had already made
clear to the Trade Commissioner that the Parliament supported Thailand’s
147 See e.g. PhRMA Press Release, Protecting Patent Rights in Thailand, 1 December 2006;
PhRMA Press Release, PhRMA Response to 2007 Special 301 Report, 30 April 2007, available
at http://phrma.org; US Chamber of Commerce Press Statement, Brazil Takes Major Step
Backward on Intellectual Property Rights, Says U.S. Chamber, 4 May 2007.
148 ‘New challenge to Thai drug licensing (Breaking News)’, Bangkok Post, 1 September 2007.
149 USTR 2007 Special 301 Report, available at <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_
Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_301_Review/ass et_upload_file230_11122.
pdf>.
150 See United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, WT/
DS152/R, 22 December 1999.
151 Official exchange of correspondence between European Commmission and Thai officials in
authors’ files. Reported on in, e.g. David Cronin, EU Split Arises Over Thai Effort To Obtain
Cheaper Patented Drugs, IP-Watch, 5 September 2007.
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compulsory licensing efforts. On July 12, the European Parliament, with
the Thai licenses very much in mind, adopted a Resolution ‘Encourag[ing]
the developing countries to use all means available to them under the TRIPS
Agreement, such as compulsory licences and the mechanism provided by
Article 30 thereof’.152 Parliament delayed ratification of the Amendment
pending further assurances from the Commission concerning its future
policies on access to medicine issues in developing countries.
For the record, Mandelson stated that Thailand’s posture ‘. . . risks forcing
more drug companies to abandon their patents and could lead to the
isolation of Thailand from the global biotechnology investment commu-
nity’.153 In reality, no drug company has abandoned a patent in Thailand.
In fact, Sanofi-Aventis has announced plans to sue an Indian producer on
the basis of its Thai clopidogrel patent. Nevertheless, the statement was
followed by a not-so-veiled threat of economic reprisal through the
withholding of foreign investment.
Mandelson further stated that ‘Neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the
Doha Declaration appear to justify a systematic policy of applying com-
pulsory licenses wherever medicines exceed certain prices’.154 As the Thai
Minister of Public Health pointed out in reply, Thailand had not adopted
such a policy,155 nor was it likely that Commissioner Mandelson had reason
to believe that it had. Nonetheless, from the standpoint of WTO law,
Mandelson misstates the rules. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not
limit the grounds on which compulsory licenses may be issued, and Para-
graph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration states that ‘Each Member has the right
to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licences are granted’.156
Every country in the EU currently regulates pharmaceutical prices. There
is not a significant difference between mandating the price of a drug and
telling a company that if its prices exceed a certain level, an alternative
supplier will be authorized. If a pharmaceutical company doing business in
152 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and access to
medicines, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0353, para 9, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-2007-0353&language=EN> [hereinafter EP
Resolution of 12 July 2007].
153 See above n 151.
154 Letter from Peter Mandelson, above n 151.
155 Letter from Dr Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thailand Ministery of Public Health, to Peter
Mandelson, dated 21 August 2007.
156 Doha Declaration, above n 33, para 5(b). See also ibid, para 4, which provides:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment
to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. [Emphasis added]
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Europe refuses to supply a patented product at the price deemed appropriate
by the government, a compulsory license—as recently evidenced by events in
Italy—may issue.157
After Commissioner Mandelson’s letter became the subject of public debate,
another unidentified ‘Commission official handling trade issues’ reportedly
went further to say that while Thailand’s first two compulsory licenses on
AIDS drugs ‘meets anyone’s understanding of an urgent public health
issue . . . Something like heart disease, perhaps does not meet the criteria’.158
The suggestion that treatments for heart disease exceed a state’s right to
grant a compulsory license conflicts directly with the TRIPS Agreement, the
Doha Declaration and the August 30 Decision. Given that the EU
Regulation implementing the Waiver Decision, and now the Amendment,
which is the subject of Parliamentary consideration, expressly applies to ‘any’
medicine, it may be that the Commission does not share the Parliamentary
and Council interpretation of the Waiver Decision as reflected in the
Regulation.
4. Concluding observations
The highly visible compulsory licenses on patented medicines issued
by Brazil and Thailand may represent a turning point in government
willingness to exercise flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement permits and
the Doha Declaration reconfirmed. Prior to these actions, developing
country governments had been reluctant to make use of these TRIPS
flexibilities, presumably out of concern for adverse reaction from major
trading partners, and possibly because they did not wish to appear hostile to
foreign direct investment.
Despite the fact that pressures on Thailand from both the US and the EU
have been increasing, there is a wider public understanding of the rights of
Members under the TRIPS Agreement today than was the case in 1997, when
these same powers wrongfully condemned South Africa for public health
legislation alleged to have been inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
Media outlets, supportive of Pharma’s tactics, can go only so far in
misrepresenting international legal rules before the critical reaction from
NGOs reveals their position to be political, not legal in nature. Moreover,
Thailand has stated its intention to bring a claim for WTO dispute settlement
if trade sanctions are wrongfully imposed. In that event, there is little
doubt that Thailand would win a dispute settlement action based on the
TRIPS-compliance of its government use licensing.
157 See above n 86 and accompanying text. For the problems with price regulation in the EU,
see Klaus Stegeman, ‘International Price Discrimination and Market Segmentation for
Patented Pharmaceuticals in the EU—A Social Welfare Analysis’, in Intellectual Property,
Public Policy, and International Trade, above n 85, at 145–68.
158 David Cronin, EU Split Arises Over Thai Effort To Obtain Cheaper Patented Drugs, IP-Watch,
5 September 2007.
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If the actions by Brazil and Thailand are successfully maintained, they
may improve the climate for use of the Article 31bis Amendment.159 If these
initiatives also stimulate other pharmaceutical stakeholders to review their
pricing strategies in the developing countries, the end result could lead to a
win–win approach for all sides, as discussed further.
D. The untested alternative route under Article 30
The pending Amendment expressly provides that WTO Members are not
precluded from exercising other rights under the TRIPS Agreement.160
Therefore, if production and export by third parties of patented medicines
were deemed permissible under Article 30, which deals with exceptions
rather than compulsory licensing,161 this possibility has not been foreclosed
by the Amendment.
Because exports of patented products under a compulsory license to assist
another country lacking manufacturing capacity inflict no harm to the
patentee in the former’s domestic market, a case can be made for invoking
the exceptions clause of Article 30 rather than the provisions of Article 31.
This begs the question of the patent holder’s expectations in the export
market, which may be offset by the importing country’s particular
circumstances and WTO-consistent legal policies. There are, however,
countervailing technical arguments that appeared to have been strengthened
by the WTO panel’s narrow interpretation of Article 30 in the Canadian
Generic Pharmaceuticals case of 1999.162
That decision, which elicited considerable academic criticism at the
time,163 preceded the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in
2001. The Declaration, in turn, so emphatically reconfirmed the flexibilities
in TRIPS pertaining to public health that it necessarily cast further doubt
on the reasoning of the panel in the Canadian Generics case, even with
regard to the dispute over the Bolar-type legislation specifically at issue
in that context. More recently, a thorough study of Article 30 has further put
in question the Panel’s reasoning in that case and advanced new arguments
159 But see the efforts to abolish compulsory licenses in Kenya, which were barely thwarted on
14 September 2007. Paul Carwood, Kenya Rejects Bid to Remove Governmental Compulsory
Licensing Flexibilities, IP Watch, 14 September 2007.
160 See Para 5, Article 31bis, above n 37.
161 See above nn 56–61. See also Christine Godt, ‘The So-Called ‘‘Waiver Compromise’’ of
Doha and Hong Kong: About Contested Concepts of the Nature of the International
Intellectual Property System’, in International Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and
International Trade, above n 85, at 201, 209–210, 227–28 (stressing legitimacy of ‘controlled
extraterritorial effects’ under TRIPS Articles 7–8, 30).
162 Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS1141R
(adopted 7 April 2000).
163 See e.g. Robert L. Howse, ‘The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel—A Dangerous
Precedent in Dangerous Times’, 3 J World Intell Prop 495 (2000).
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supporting the use of Article 30 to achieve the goals of pending Article 31bis
without the complications under review in this article.164
As discussed further, the authors (along with many NGOs) view this route
as an option that governments may wish to consider. In this connection,
the European Parliament has recently approved a resolution asking the
Commission to respect EU Member States leeway to pursue an Article 30
alternative solution, if they choose to do so, even after eventual ratification
of Article 31bis.165
In any event, the Amendment makes it clear that countries are not
precluded from exporting under compulsory licenses within the otherwise
applicable limitations of Article 31(f) (i.e. less than a predominant part
of production), without resort to the special legal machinery envisioned in
the Amendment. The continuing applicability of Article 30 also permits
exports to countries that are not members of the WTO, including a
number of the poor countries of the world that may particularly need to
import medicines under compulsory licenses. There is no reason why an
exporting WTO Member cannot extend the availability of the solution
to an importing non-member as a limited exception to the rights of
the patent holder in the exporting country, especially if the importing
non-member provides a diplomatic representation that it will abide by
the conditions of the Amendment. Indeed, several WTO Members have
already implemented this option for non-members of the WTO.166
E. Multilateral negotiations on a substantive patent law treaty (SPLT)
As previously reported, India recently undertook the arduous task of con-
forming its patent law to the norms of the TRIPS Agreement, a process that
has generated much controversy and still uncertain results. Like all
developing countries, India had to reconcile the international minimum
standards of intellectual property protection with its own cultural and
technical assets, with a view to minimizing the social costs and maximizing
the potential gains in trade.167 Making this assessment with regard to the
needs of India’s public health sector proved especially daunting because of
tensions between the pro-competitive outlook of its robust generic
pharmaceutical industry and the more protectionist views of its growing
research-based pharmaceutical sector.
This legislative exercise has produced a novel and ingenious mix of
domestic and international provisions, whose economic effects remain to be
seen and whose legal validity was recently challenged by major
164 See Christopher Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, UNCTAD-
ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17 (2006).
165 See EP Resolution of 12 July 2007, above n 152, para 10.
166 See e.g. implementing legislation of Canada, the EU and Norway.
167 See generally, J.H. Reichman, ‘From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
under the TRIPS Agreement’, 29 N Y U J Int’l L & Pol 11 (1997).
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pharmaceutical companies in the Novartis case and questioned by the US
Trade Representative.168 In this case, Novartis challenged Section 3(d) of
the amended India Patents Act as being inconsistent with Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement and the Indian Constitution169 because it discriminated
against the pharmaceutical sector. Amended Section 3(d) denies patent-
ability for claims of modifications to previously known pharmaceutical
substances that do not demonstrate significant enhancement in ‘efficacy’. In
layman’s terms, to obtain a patent on a modification to an already known
product, under amended Section 3(d), the applicant must show that the
change improves the treatment. This is hardly a startling proposition.170
The Madras High Court rejected Novartis’ claim on the grounds that
India, following the British Commonwealth constitutional model, does
not permit the direct effect of treaties (such as the WTO and TRIPS
Agreements).171 Novartis thus lacked standing under Indian law to challenge
the TRIPS consistency of the legislation. The Court also rejected Novartis’
claim that the Amended Patents Act provision was unconstitutional
because it delegated overly broad authority to the Patent Office to determine
the meaning of ‘efficacy.’ It observed that efficacy is a well-understood
concept in the field of pharmaceuticals, that it would be exceedingly difficult
to prescribe a fixed meaning of that concept applicable across all pharma-
ceutical inventions, and that the development of standards to assess efficacy
was perfectly consistent with the role of the Patent Office as contemplated by
the Indian Parliament.
Subsequent to the decision, the Chairman of Novartis announced that
the company would redirect its research and development program away
from India to more receptive environments.172 Whether the EU, Switzerland
or the United States will eventually challenge India’s patent law before
the WTO remains to be seen, once the Indian courts apply its provisions
to the patents emerging from the mailbox. In any event, because India
remains the largest alternative supplier of generic drugs to the developing
world market at the present time, the results of its legislative balancing act at
home could affect the availability and affordability of essential medicines in
all developing countries for a considerable period of time.173
168 See e.g. Janis M. Mueller, ‘Taking TRIPS to India—Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to
Medicines’, 356 New England J Medicine 541; Janis M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens, above
n 28.
169 See Novartis v India, W.P. Nos. 24759 of 2006 and 24760 of 2006, High Court of Madras
(India), decided 6 August 2007.
170 It is worth noting that the US PTO applied an efficacy test to claimed pharmaceutical
inventions prior to the decision by the Federal Circuit in In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir
1995).
171 Novartis v India above n 169.
172 Andrew Jack, Novartis to move Indian R&D, FT.com, 22 August 2007.
173 The legal challenge to India’s statute mounted by Novartis is reminiscent of the unsuccessful
effort by major originator pharmaceutical companies to derail South Africa’s progressive
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997. The South Africa case
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The highly publicized debate about domestic patent reform in India is
thus emblematic of a similar, if quieter, process that has been taking place in
all developing countries (except for the LDCs) over the past few years.
How all these countries implement the TRIPS standards into their domestic
laws will determine the balance between private incentives to innovate and
the public interest in free competition, with serious short- and medium-term
implications for economic growth and development. This process manifestly
requires time, capacity building and cumulative technical expertise, as well as
a suitable business infrastructure, to succeed in the end.174
Yet, time and patience is exactly what the OECD countries seem deter-
mined not to grant the developing world in this respect. On the contrary,
the OECD countries, grouped within WIPO’s Standing Committee on
the Law of Patents (SCP), have pressed the developing countries to adhere
to a draft SPLT.175 This proposed treaty represents an attempt ‘to pursue a
‘‘deep harmonization’’ of both the law and practice’ concerning not just
the drafting, filing and examination of patent applications, but also
cornerstone requirements of patentability, such as novelty, nonobviousness,
sufficiency of description, and drafting and interpretation of claims.176
Notably, through the efforts of the so-called Group of Friends of Devel-
opment,177 this initiative is also being tested against the drive for a more
riveted public attention because it was wrongfully pursued under the TRIPS Agreement in
the face of a mushrooming HIV-AIDS pandemic, and it appeared to show a blatant disregard
for the public health consequences of blindly pursuing enforcement of international trade
and patent rules (without legal justification).
174 See e.g. Maskus and Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods’, above n 7.
175 See Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(SPLT), 10th Sess., 10–14 May 2004, WIPO doc. SCP/10/2, 30 September 2003; Standing
Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), Information on Certain Recent Developments in
Relation to the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), 10th Sess., 10–14 May 2004,
WIPO doc. SCP/10/8, 17 March 2004; Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, (SCP),
Report, 10th Sess., 10–14 May 2004, WIPO doc. SCP/10/11, 1 June 2005.
176 Karen M. Hauda, ‘The Role of the United States in World-Wide Protection of Industrial
Property’, in The Future of Intellectual Property in the Global Market of the Information Society
91, 97 (2003) (‘This approach was adopted in an attempt to avoid the controversial hurdles
to agreement that were found in the past.’). See also Philippe Baechtold, The Future Role of
WIPO, in the Area of Industrial Property, ibid at 139, 142–3 (highlighting the need to cover
other topics such as patentable subject matter, the requirement of technical character of an
invention, exceptions from patentability, novelty grace period and issue of equivalents). All of
these issues constitute ‘flexibilities’ under the TRIPS Agreement, of which compulsory
licensing is but one very important component. See generally, Carlos Correa, Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary On The Trips Agreement (Oxford
University Press 2007).
177 On 4 October 2004, the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization
agreed to adopt a proposal presented by the Group of Friends of Development (namely:
Argentina and Brazil), for the establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, Doc. WO/
GA/31/11. Since then, many other proposals have been presented and discussed, see e.g.
Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Proposal for
a Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda, PCDA/2/2
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development-friendly agenda at WIPO, with a view to ensuring consideration
of the needs of all nations, whatever their technological capacities may be.178
In a forthcoming article, Prof. Reichman and Prof. Cooper Dreyfuss
demonstrate the likely adverse affects a further round of patent harmoniza-
tion would have on the developing countries.179 These include:
 Erosion of whatever flexibilities these countries still retain under the
TRIPS Agreement.
 The risk that virtually every pro-competitive option still left open—from
exceptions to patentability, limitations on exclusive rights, and the
possibility of imposing compulsory licenses—would shrink or
disappear.180
They conclude that what developing countries most need is a ‘period of
calm and stability in which to devise intellectual property strategies con-
sistent with both the TRIPS Agreement and the needs of their own emerging
national and regional systems of innovation . . . They cannot succeed if,
at the international level, a new round of multilateral intellectual property
negotiations threatens to raise the technological ladder once again before
they even get a solid foot hold on it.’181
Reichman and Dreyfuss also argue that a premature patent harmonization
exercise of this kind could boomerang against the very developed countries
that are pushing it forward at WIPO.182 They point out that there is no
consensus on how the patent law should address new technologies, and that
the US Supreme Court has radically been reshaping the domestic patent
system.183 The European Patent Office, which has increasingly experimented
with new approaches to new technologies that deviate from US practice,
recently issued its own cautionary views on the future of patent law.184
(22 June 2006), available at http://www.stakeholderforum.org/22june2006.html. See also
James Boyle, ‘A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property’, 2004 Duke L &
Tech Rev 9 (2004).
178 See generally, papers presented at the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Open
Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), International Conference
Center (ICC), Geneva, Switzerland, 1–3 March 2006 [hereinafter WIPO Open Forum],
available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html.
179 Jerome H. Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘Harmonization without Consensus:
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty’, 57 Duke L J 85 (2007).
180 Ibid.
181 Reichman and Cooper Dreyfuss, above n 179. See also Maskus and Reichman, above n 7;
Joseph Stiglitz, The Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property, Frei Lecture, Duke
University School of Law, 16 February 2007, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/;
Margaret Chon, above n 11.
182 Reichman and Cooper Dreyfuss, above n 179.
183 See e.g. E-Bay v MercExchange, 126 Sup. Ct. 1837 (2006); Merck v Integra Lifeseciences,
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005), and KSR v Teleflex, 127 Sup. Ct. 1727 (2007).
184 EPO, The Future of Patent Law (2007).
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While we lack space to explore these matters in depth, we reiterate the
view that ‘any attempt to achieve deep harmonization of world patent law at
the present time, such as that contemplated by the SPLT, is premature’.185
What is needed, instead, is a period of experimentation in which different
countries at different levels of development seek to adapt the traditional
patent system to their own needs, taking into account the challenges of new
technologies and of the emerging transnational system of innovation as a
whole that TRIPS brought into existence.186
F. The problem of the free trade agreements
The originator pharmaceutical industry based in OECD countries was not
satisfied with the terms of the TRIPS Agreement negotiated during the
Uruguay Round. Moreover, increased protection for this industry is not a
realistic negotiating objective at the WTO, at least under present cir-
cumstances, and further harmonization under the SPLT at WIPO has
encountered mounting opposition.
As a ‘second best’ solution, US pharmaceutical originators (represented by
PhRMA) have intensively lobbied USTR and other parts of the US gov-
ernment (including Congress) to incorporate higher levels of industry pro-
tection in bilateral and regional free-trade agreements (FTAs).187 The EU
originator pharmaceutical companies are similarly lobbying the European
Commission and EU institutions (and Member State governments), perhaps
so far with somewhat less overall success.
1. Agreements of the United States
A modest level of enhanced protection (above that later provided by the
TRIPS Agreement) had been incorporated into NAFTA.188 However, the
trend towards higher levels of protection commenced in earnest with nego-
tiation of an FTA with Jordan in 2001, and has progressed through a series
of FTAs with developing and developed countries, including Chile, Australia,
Singapore, Morocco, Central America (including Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic) (‘CAFTA-
DR’), Bahrain, Oman, and in signed, but not yet ratified, agreements with
Panama´, Peru, Colombia and South Korea.189
185 Reichman and Cooper Dreyfuss, above n 179.
186 See Maskus and Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods, above’ n 7.
187 For an economic assessment, see Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, above n 10. For
legal analysis and additional references see Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, above n 27 at
349 ff and Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade
Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law, UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and
Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 12, February 2006.
188 See e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Articles 1709 and 1711, available
at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org.
189 Texts generally available at <http://www.ustr.gov>.
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Although the patent and pharmaceutical regulatory terms of the FTAs
vary with the different agreements, they follow a common template.
The main objectives are to:
 extend the scope of patent protection to cover new uses of known
compounds, and plants (and, on occasion) animals;
 provide patent term extensions to offset regulatory delay;
 limit the scope of permissible exceptions to patent rights;
 provide fixed periods of marketing exclusivity for a broad class of
previously unapproved products, based on submission of regulatory data
(especially clinical trial data) or reliance on foreign marketing approval
or foreign submission of regulatory data;
 prohibit effective granting of marketing approval by the health
regulatory authority during the patent term without the consent or
acquiescence of patent holders (‘linkage’);
 authorize nonviolation nullification or impairment dispute settlement
claims;
 prohibit parallel importation (in some cases); and
 limit the grounds for granting compulsory licensing (in higher income
countries).
The combined impact of these various restrictive provisions is to significantly
strengthen the position of originator–patent holder pharmaceutical enter-
prises on national markets, and thereby to erect barriers to the introduction
of generic pharmaceutical products.
One major concern with several of the foregoing restrictive measures is
that they could effectively preclude use of compulsory licensing because they
contained no language that expressly avoids this result. Virtually all countries
require the public health authority to approve and register a medicine before
distribution on the market. The provisions of the FTAs for patent linkage
make no provision for registration of generic medicines produced under
compulsory licenses, while otherwise requiring the consent of the patent
holder for marketing approval. In response to objections from NGOs and
members of Congress, USTR appended ‘side letters’ to the FTAs intended
to give the appearance of addressing this problem. But USTR refused to
acknowledge that these attachments resulted in any exception to the express
terms of the agreements.190
Although the EU’s pharmaceutical originator enterprises are not direct
participants in these FTA negotiations, they remain indirect beneficiaries of
their terms once concluded. This result follows from Article 4 of the TRIPS
190 See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, above n 27, at 352–3 (discussing USTR’s position
regarding the legal effect of public health side letters).
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Agreement, which requires the extension of most favored nation (MFN)
treatment to all WTO Members.191
After the Democratic Party gained control of the Congress beginning in
2007, certain changes were agreed upon between the Executive (represented
by USTR) and congressional leaders with respect to signed, but not yet
ratified, FTAs (with developing countries).192 Although the changes intro-
duced by this agreement undoubtedly represent an improvement over the
pre-existing situation, additional obligations have also been proposed that
would reduce the magnitude of these changes.
The new template, as reflected in the terms of the amended FTA between
the United States and Peru,193 introduces an explicit exception from mar-
keting exclusivity with respect to the grant of compulsory licenses. This
eliminates the need to rely on the side letters mentioned above, which
effectively rewrote and narrowed the Waiver Decision and Amendment
Article 31bis.
The new template removes most of the language providing extraterritorial
effect for the submission of regulatory data in the United States (and
elsewhere) that pertains to pharmaceutical products, although this effect is
retained for agricultural chemicals. The marketing exclusivity provision for
pharmaceutical products establishes a presumptive five-year term as the
‘reasonable period’ of protection, taking into account the nature of the data
and the expenditure in creating it.194 This leaves room for a reduced period
of protection (but also does not expressly incorporate an upper limit on the
term of protection).195
The marketing exclusivity provision limits the term of protection, for
countries which rely on foreign approval, to the term in the country whose
approval is relied upon, but only if the relying country approves the appli-
cation for registration within six months.196 Note that for some countries a
six-month approval cycle might be unattainable. The text does not expressly
limit the marketing exclusivity period in the foreign country. One can
191 TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, Article 4. Regional agreements entered into subsequent to
entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement do not enjoy an exclusion from the requirement of
extending MFN [pursuant to Article 4(d) of the TRIPS Agreement]. See UNCTAD-ICTSD
Resource Book on Trips and Development, above n 1 at 77–82; Abbott, WTO Medicines
Decision, above n 27 at 357 (stressing trade barrier effects of intellectual property provisions).
192 See e.g. USTR, Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy: Intellectual Property, May 2007,
Trade Facts, available at <http://www.ustr.gov>.
193 Available at http://www.wto.gov.
194 Ibid.
195 Whether the template allows for ‘cost sharing’ rather than exclusivity in some circumstances
also remains unclear. For the view that ‘cost sharing’ should have been the preferred
approach, see Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical
Trial Data: From Private to Public Goods?’, in Negotiating Health—Intellectual Property and
Access to Medicines, P. Roffe et al., (eds), (Earthscan 2006), 133–46 [hereinafter Negotiating
Health].
196 See above n 193.
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imagine requests to match the foreign exclusivity period, even if this is not
expressly required.197
The new template makes patent term extension with respect to
pharmaceutical products optional for delays based on regulatory approval
and patent application approval.198 It also adds an obligation to provide
preliminary injunctions or equivalent effective provisional measures for
claims of infringement covering a patent on an approved pharmaceutical
product or its approved method of use.199 Given the ambiguity or open-
ended quality of some of the provisions on marketing exclusivity, and the
new provisions on remedies, we foresee continuing discussions about the
extent to which the FTAs inhibit access to medicines.
2. Agreements of the European Union
The EU has nominally adopted a policy of not pursuing pharmaceutical-
related TRIPS-plus commitments in its negotiations with developing
countries, while nonetheless ‘free riding’ on the pharmaceuticals commit-
ments obtained by the United States. In this sense, further EU negotiations
on this topic could be superfluous (at least in so far as the EU and
United States are negotiating with the same parties). However, it is not really
the case that the EU foregoes additional pharmaceutical-related commit-
ments in its bilateral and regional negotiations.200
First, in its proposed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the EU is negotiating for
adherence to or acceptance of the obligations of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT)201 and the Patent Law Treaty (PLT).202 These procedural
treaties facilitate obtaining patents in the signatory countries. Given the
growing number of pharmaceutical patent filings in developing countries,
197 The new template changes the products affected by marketing exclusivity from ‘new
pharmaceutical product’ to ‘new chemical entity’. ‘New pharmaceutical product’ had been
further defined to refer to products not previously approved in the national territory, which
appeared to require treating products not previously approved only in other countries as
‘new’. The new template does not further define ‘new chemical entity’, providing some
discretion as to how that term will be applied. However, because of language in the new
template indicating when marketing exclusivity need not be provided, some clarification of
the intent of the new terms will be needed.
198 See above n 193.
199 This specific obligation which did not appear previously in the enforcement section of the IP
chapter template, is accompanied by a requirement that the patent holder be given adequate
notice and sufficient time to bring such an action prior to the marketing of the allegedly
infringing product. Note that, in many developing countries, preliminary injunctions can
effectively hinder generic producers seeking to enter the market. Moreover, while ‘method of
use’ language was used in the prior template, the context was subtly different which may also
raise issues in some legal systems.
200 And this is leaving aside the fact that the EU has required countries joining the Union to
accept the full panoply of EU regulations respecting pharmaceuticals, which in some cases
(e.g. Hungary) adversely affected local generic producers.
201 Patent Cooperation Treaty, 19 June 1970, 28 UST 7645, 1160 UNTS 231.
202 Patent Law Treaty, 1 June 2000, 39 ILM 1047 (2000).
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this obligation may have a significant impact on the number of patents on
pharmaceutical products and processes granted in the ACP countries. At the
very least, it affords originators a 30-month priority period during which
investors in generic products cannot readily enter local markets, even if no
patent applications have been filed.203
Second, and more important, the EU is effectively seeking to burden the
ACP countries with the duty to implement the terms of its Intellectual
Property Enforcement Directive.204 One enforcement provision of a draft
EPA proposed by the Commission205 requires that competent judicial
authorities, ‘even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of
the case’, on the basis of ‘reasonably available evidence to support [a patent
holder’s] claims’‘. . . may ‘order prompt and effective provisional measures’
‘. . . including ‘the physical seizure of the infringing goods, and, in
appropriate cases, the materials and implements used in the production
and/or distribution of these goods’.
Such a provision, with a low evidentiary standard and lacking a temporal
limitation, may have a chilling impact on producers of generic medicines
who are threatened with seizure of products and production equipment in
advance of a determination as to the validity of the evidence. The seizures
could last for an extended duration and cripple the business without any
meaningful judicial process. Although the draft EPA text includes language
like that used in Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement,206 it goes substantially
beyond Article 50, and does not expressly incorporate protections for
defendants found in that Article.207
There are various other enforcement provisions in the draft EPAs that
could undermine the interests of the generics sector in developing
countries.208 Yet, the European Parliament recently adopted a report on
EPAs, which asked the Commission not to include IP provisions that could
adversely affect access to essential medicines.209
203 See Maximiliano Santa Cruz S., Intellectual Property Provisions in European Union Trade
Agreements, ICTSD Issue Paper No. 20 (2007).
204 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195/16, 2 June 2004.
205 The authors have received draft texts in confidence from negotiators and do not consider
that further identification of source is necessary or appropriate here.
206 See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, Article 50.
207 See e.g. ibid, Articles 50.6 and 50.7.
208 For example, Article 4 of the EU Enforcement Directive, above n 204, replicated in draft
EPAs, provides that: ‘Member States shall recognize as persons entitled to seek application
of the measures, procedures and remedies referred to in this chapter: . . . (d) professional
defence bodies which are regularly recognized as having a right to represent holders of IPRs,
in so far as permitted by and in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law.’ Here
the EU aims to provide ‘friends of Pharma’ with an explicit right to initiate legal claims
against generic producers seeking entry into the national market.
209 European Parliament resolution of 23 May 2007 on Economic Partnership Agreements
(2005/2246(INI)) P6_TA-PROV(2007)0204, at para 45. The European Parliament renewed
this request in the resolution adopted on 12 July 2007, above n 152.
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A developing country that enters into an FTA with the United States and
an EPA with the EU along the lines of those currently proposed will be
constrained to provide a very strong market dominant position for phar-
maceutical originator companies, and thus to create substantial obstacles to
the introduction of generic products. In light of the importance of the
national implementation process, moreover, it is difficult to assess the full
impact of the new US FTA policy until the details are more fully developed
and made public.210
Nevertheless, we believe that EPAs should refrain from imposing any new
intellectual property obligations on APC countries that could affect their
public health programs. To this end, the European Parliament has adopted
a new resolution expressly calls upon the EC to endorse full implementation
in APC countries of the flexibilities set out in the TRIPS Agreement,
as recognized in the Doha Declaration ‘to promote access to medicines
for all’.211
G. The World Health Organization’s intergovernmental
working group on public health, innovation
and intellectual property (IGWG)
Under pressure from developing country governments and NGOs, WHO
has initiated a process to assess the global situation concerning public
health, innovation and intellectual property, and to recommend an action
plan geared to its findings.212 Meetings bearing on the Intergovernmental
Working Group (IGWG) are taking place in Geneva, and the prospective
impact of this ongoing work at the WHO remains hard to predict.
Nonetheless, the WHO was absent during the GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations, and over the past decade its leadership has played a modest role
in global debates concerning intellectual property and access to medicines.
That these issues appear to have gained greater prominence in WHO
discussions is, therefore, a positive development.213
Brazil, Kenya, Thailand and other developing countries have urged the
WHO to adopt an action plan that would encourage research and devel-
opment directed to medicines important for developing countries and that
would improve access to medicines for the bulk of the world’s population.
This plan should embrace not only tropical, neglected or poverty-related
210 The United States government (and the EC in the case of EPAs) may play a substantial role
in proposing and reviewing the rules at the local level, which is consistent with US practise
concerning oversight of the implementation of FTA obligations.
211 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and access to
medicines, above n 152, para 11.
212 Documents available at http://www.who.int/phi/en/.
213 However, Eric Stein’s seminal article concerning the democratization process at the WHO
should provide a note of caution regarding expectations in this regard. See Eric Stein,
‘International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight’, 95 AJIL 489 (2001).
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diseases, but also diseases common to developing and developed countries,
such as cancer and coronary disease.214 These demandeurs seek concrete
measures for promoting transfer of technology to improve the capacity of
poor countries to participate fully in the development and production of
medicines.
Recent discussions at IGWG have focused on proposals to re-examine the
link between pricing and the cost of R&D, with a view to devising workable
new models. There is also growing interest in forming patent pools to deal
with poverty-related, tropical and neglected diseases, with the participation
of public-private partnerships, such as UNITAID.
Although the EU and the United States have participated in these dis-
cussions, the EU aims to ensure that the WHO does not become a primary
forum for consideration of IP-related issues.215 We believe, instead that both
intergovernmental organizations have important roles to play in negotiations
concerning patents and other intellectual property rights (IPRs), because
IPRs affect Member States’ abilities to maintain adequate supplies of
medicines as a public good.216 The WHO is the designated international
governance agency for public health. Nothing has so disrupted the national
health ministries’ traditional roles in this regard as the top-down, private law
codifications of IPRs driven through other international forums with little
inputs from them.
While the GATT and WTO were conceived to promote reduction of trade
barriers and the free flow of goods and services, patents may create trade
barriers, even as they provide incentives to innovate and greater certainty for
transfers of technology. Because patents impose significant public health
costs by fostering high medicines prices, they are no less relevant to the
WHO than to the WTO (or WIPO for that matter). OECD countries might
accordingly wish to devote more of their efforts at the WHO to developing
an IP environment that promotes public health, without unduly dampening
R&D incentives, and spend less time engaging in ‘damage control’ with
respect to rules previously negotiated at the WTO and WIPO.
214 See e.g. Submissions of Brazil, Kenya, Thailand and others regarding ‘Elements of a global
strategy and plan of action’, A/PHI/IGWG/1/5, available at http://www.who.int/phi/en/.
215 See e.g. Comments by the EU, Consultations on ‘Elements of a global strategy and plan of
action’ (A/PHI/IGWG/1/5), 28/02/2007, available at http://www.who.int.
216 See e.g. Heinz Klug, ‘Access to Essential Medicines: Promoting Human Rights Over Free
Trade and Intellectual Property Claims’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7,
481–92. See also Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman and Anthony D. So, ‘The Case for
Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials’, Economists’ Voice (January 2007),
available at www.bepress.com/ev; Gregory Schaffer, ‘Recognizing Public Goods in WTO
Dispute Settlement’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7, 884–908; Graeme
Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation
of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law’, in IP and International Public
Goods, above n 7, 861–883.
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III. MAKING THE AMENDMENT SYSTEM WORK
Cumbersome as it may be, the compromise accepted in the Waiver Decision
of August 30 and the corresponding Amendment was arguably the best
available at the time and better than alternatives then on the table. Without
underestimating its formalistic nature and built-in administrative roadblocks,
we believe it can be made workable if governments seeking assistance muster
the political will and skill to use the system. Countries able to supply the
drugs requested must also enact suitable enabling legislation without too
many additional limiting wrinkles imposed by special interest lobbying, as
occurred in Canada.217
In this connection, the Indian enabling legislation appears supportive of
the goals behind the Amendment,218 which, of course, promotes the interests
of its generic producers. The Secretary-General of the Indian Pharmaceutical
Alliance is on record as expressing the willingness of his constituency to
respond to requests for assistance by other developing countries, and a
spokesman for the European generics industry has also expressed interest.219
Whether the countries with the greatest capacity will in fact respond depends
on a number of imponderables, including the size of the target market, the
procurement guarantees and the stability of local conditions at any given
time. Nonetheless, given the legal infrastructure and the known capacities
and interest of the Indian and European generic companies, prospects for
fruitful collaboration seem reasonably promising.
Converting this promise to reality could largely depend on the strategies of
the would-be user countries. Aside from major autonomous markets in
middle-income countries, such as those of Thailand and Brazil, much could
depend on whether the effort to obtain any given drug is initiated by single
countries, each going its own way, or by a number of countries willing and
able to pool their single compulsory licenses in a consortium that could
afford greater buying power and offer suppliers sounder incentives to invest
in production.
In what follows, we outline a blueprint for effective implementation based
on what the evolving legal infrastructure makes possible. While real-world
obstacles abound, our primary task here is to emphasize what could be done
with willpower, skill and resources. OECD governments could themselves
play a role in transforming possibilities into practice, given the political will
to do so.
217 See above n 101 and accompanying text.
218 However, this conclusion presupposes suitable Indian implementing regulations, that are yet
to be adopted.
219 See remarks of Greg Perry, Director-General, European Generic Medicines Association,
hearing before the European Parliament International Trade Committee, 5 June 2007. The
positive views of the Indian generic association were expressed by Dilip Shah, Director-
General of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, inter alia, at a Roundtable on Global
Pharmaceutical Regulation held at Florida State University College of Law, 5–7 April 2007.
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A. Goals and limits of compulsory licensing
Existing WTO jurisprudence suggests that when tensions arise between the
Members’ efforts to provide domestic public goods, such as public health,
and the private rights of patentees, Members should look to both the
codified exceptions to those rights under Article 30 and to the broad possi-
bilities for imposing compulsory licenses under Article 31 (and Amendment
Article 31bis), before invoking still untested claims for waivers under the
hardship escape clauses of Articles 7 and 8.220 In the public health sector,
developing countries resort to compulsory licensing—either by threat or
actual imposition—in order to persuade pharmaceutical companies to lower
the prices of specific medicines to the point where they become available to
mass market consumers in need of them and not just to affluent members of
any given community.
Such licenses are a critical tool for promoting effective price negotiations
with patent holders and for enabling local production, importation and dis-
tribution of patented medicines at affordable prices.221 Where local author-
ities directly undertake the provision of medicines to meet important public
health needs, including the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the obligation to match
the costs of distribution with available public resources also exerts pressure
to issue compulsory licenses.222
Between unregulated monopoly pricing, on one hand, and compulsory
licensing on the other, there exist intermediate regimes based on price
regulation, which are widely practised in OECD countries. An illuminating
example is the case of Canada, which moved from a regime of routine
compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals to a regime of price con-
trols in 1992.223 These price controls help Canada keep the costs of its
socialized medicine program within budgetary reach. With some notable
exceptions, developing countries have not widely experimented with price
controls on essential medicines, an option that might affect the extent to
which compulsory licensing was also employed.224
When, instead, developing-country governments resort to compulsory
licensing (or threats thereof), they typically seek to move the pharmaceutical
companies away from a marketing strategy based on ‘low-volume, high
margin returns’ to a strategy based on ‘high-volume, low margin returns,’225
which is more characteristic of the generic industries. Given that generic
220 See e.g. Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R
(adopted 7 April 2000); UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book, above n 1, at 118–33 (discussing
TRIPS Articles 7–8).
221 See e.g. Thai White Paper, above n 141.
222 See above n 130–40 and accompanying text (case of Brazil).
223 See Reichman with Hasenzahl, ‘Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: The
Canadian Experience, (ICTSD/UNCTAD 2003).
224 Kevin Outterson, ‘Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low- and Middle-
Income Countries, 32 Am J Law & Med 159, 161 (2006).
225 See above text accompanying nn 144–45.
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industries operating under the latter strategy remain profitable, one may ask
why the big pharmaceutical companies do not voluntarily adopt similar
pricing strategies on a voluntary basis in developing countries, given that
they typically expect to recoup R&D costs plus the bulk of their profits in
OECD markets.226
There are different theories to account for this resistance. One is that
because a patent monopoly gives control over prices, the lack of competition
simply dulls any incentive to price-differentiate. A second theory is that
the pharmaceutical companies fear a ‘reference pricing backlash’, which
would occur if low prices in developing countries were used as benchmarks
by price regulators in developed countries.227 A third theory is that selling
needed medicines to the affluent at very high prices in developing countries
is objectively more profitable than mass-marketing at low prices. A fourth
theory is that pharmaceutical companies are concerned that parallel
imported, favorably priced medicines would compete with higher priced
offerings.228 A fifth theory is that all the above four theories play some part
in resistance to price discrimination.
Whatever the truth may be, we emphasize that the overall goal in
evaluating the pending Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement is the extent to
which it can help developing countries shift the patentees’ strategy to a ‘high
volume—low margin’ approach without unduly impacting incentives to
invest and to innovate. The more that the system as a whole encourages
pharmaceutical companies to adopt such a strategy voluntarily without
government intervention, the less friction it will generate and the more
successful it will be.
Here, however, a cautionary note is in order. The foregoing propositions
rest on the premise that originator pharmaceutical companies typically
recoup their R&D costs plus reasonable profits in OECD markets.229 So
long as this premise holds, experts in the field maintain that developing
country governments that paid these companies their marginal costs of pro-
duction plus a 5% royalty would normally be providing generous com-
pensation under either a price regulation scheme or a compulsory license.230
226 See e.g. Outterson, above n 224; Letter from Al Engleberg (on file with the authors).
227 See e.g. Patricia M. Danzon and Adrian Towse, ‘Theory and Implementation of Differential
Pricing for Pharmaceuticals’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7 at 425–56.
228 See e.g. Harvey E. Bale Jr, ‘The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and Product Access and
Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals’, 1 J Int’l Econ L 637 (1998); see also Klaus
Stegman, above n 157 (discussing problems of imperfect market segmentation in EU).
229 The authors do not imply that originator practices in areas such as marketing and executive
compensation are presently appropriate and reasonable, but rather they indicate a premise
for discussion. See e.g. Carsten Fink, ‘Comment’, in International Intellectual Property, Public
Policy, and International Trade, above n 85, at 169, 171 (noting high marketing expenditures
of US industry).
230 See e.g. Letter from Al Engleberg, above n 226.
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If, instead, pharmaceutical companies either in OECD countries or
elsewhere responded to the TRIPS patent incentives by investing in R&D
that pertained to poverty-related, tropical or neglected diseases of primary
concern to developing countries, then resort to compulsory licensing would
require a different calculus. These companies would necessarily have to seek
returns on investment in the affected countries, and ex post resort to
compulsory licensing could skew the ex ante investment calculus that led to
medical discoveries in the first place.231
In such cases, much obviously depends on the extent to which government
funding itself played a role in the R&D efforts and on the pricing strategies
voluntarily adopted by the patent holder. We shall return to these conside-
rations later on. Nevertheless, we emphasize that care must be taken to focus
on the facts of single cases, with a view to achieving win–win situations for all
stakeholders over time, when possible.
B. The high transaction costs of single state action232
Haphazard action by single states seeking to impose compulsory licenses on
patented pharmaceuticals is limited by economic, legal and technical factors.
While middle-income markets, such as those of Thailand and Brazil, are
large enough to warrant investments in the production of generic drugs by
potential suppliers, the same cannot be said of most other markets in the
developing world. Taken one by one, in other words, problems may arise
from a lack of economies of scale and scope.
The costs of uncoordinated legal action by single states seeking
compulsory licenses are reinforced by a territorial notion of international
patent law and by the independence of patents doctrine.233 These principles
support the kind of market segmentation in which each new supply problem
entails a new cat-and-mouse game between patentees and the local
governments. In this game, the patentees are the repeat performers, and
their powers are augmented by the limited sources of supply—especially of
key active ingredients—within the control of big pharmaceutical companies
based in developed countries. As a result, these companies often influence
the choice of rules under which specific legal contests will occur and the pace
at which ultimate decisions will be made.
231 See e.g. Allan O Sykes, above n 25. See generally Mark Lemley, ‘Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property’, 71 U Chi L Rev 129 (2004).
232 This and the following sections are drawn from Jerome H. Reichman, ‘Procuring Essential
Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions: The Prospects for Regional
Pharmaceutical Supply Centers’, Paper prepared for the Seminar on Intellectual Property
Arrangements: Implications for Developing Country Productive Capabilities in the Supply of
Essential Medicines, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 18–20 October 2006.
233 Paris Convention above n 3, Articles 2(1), 4bis(2).
972 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 10(4)
Strategies premised on national action alone could thus entail high trans-
action costs in overcoming an array of technical legal obstacles, and they
could require levels of organizational and administrative skills and drive that
are often lacking in smaller developing countries. Given a predictable lack of
coordination among developing country governments, moreover, action by
single states on a case-by-case approach will remain vulnerable to strong
legal and economic pressures by rights holders, in the form of defensive
actions to choke off critical sources of supply. Even when single battles are
won with regard to a specific medicine needed by any given country, the
whole process must then be wound up and started over again for the next
drug in the next country, with all the legal, economic, and political costs to
be repeated.
This patchwork quilt of territorial measures and countermeasures adds to
the transaction costs of all the stakeholders without appreciably stabilizing
the chain of supply or ensuring access to essential medicines for citizens in
poor countries as a whole. Above all, this strategy does little to increase local
capacity to produce essential medicines or to reduce the dependence of poor
countries on distant foreign suppliers whose research agendas are over-
whelmingly geared to market opportunities in developed countries.
C. The potential benefits of pooled procurement strategies
A more promising strategy is to think in regional or sub-regional terms, with
a view to standardizing procedures, to lowering the transaction costs of all
participating countries, and to stabilizing the availability of medical supplies
that all the participating countries are likely to need. On this approach,
a group of developing countries interested in price regulation of pharma-
ceuticals could harmonize and coordinate their policies in this regard. With
or without price regulation, a pooled procurement strategy would provide
incentives to the originator pharmaceutical companies themselves to become
‘low bidders’ under supply contracts offered by a centralized procurement
authority.
Originator pharmaceutical companies that cooperated with such an
authority could preserve market share and benefit from economies of scale
and scope. When such cooperation was lacking, however, a centralized pro-
curement authority could offer attractive investment opportunities to pro-
spective generic suppliers who could gear production to the larger market
that cumulative or pooled compulsory licenses made available.
A pooled procurement strategy would also greatly enhance the procure-
ment agency’s opportunities to stimulate direct investment in local
production facilities within the region and to obtain support for training
and research to enhance that region’s own capabilities. Technical assistance
of this kind could become particularly effective if developed country gov-
ernments subscribed to a proposal to ‘buy out’ the rights to supply
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developing country markets from the pharmaceutical companies them-
selves;234 pursued the establishment of essential medicines patent pools that
would offer low (or no) cost production licenses;235 or otherwise persuaded
patent holders to permit the use of their technologies on preferential terms in
developing country markets.236
Ideally, a pooled procurement strategy, operating under the facilitations of
Amendment Article 31bis, would offer the greatest benefits to a large
number of cooperating countries, half of which were LDCs. This model is
particularly suited to conditions in Africa. As explained subsequently,
moreover, tangible benefits could nonetheless arise from much smaller
arrangements between two or three countries, and even when none of the
participating countries were LDCs.
1. A large regional model with many LDCs
Consider the possibilities that might arise if 12 African countries formed a
loose trade association to qualify under Article 31bis (3), in which at least six
of the participating countries were LDCs. Assume further that these count-
ries established a Regional Pharmaceutical Supply Center (RPSC), which
could organize the procurement of pharmaceuticals needed to fulfill the
demand created by the emission of as many as twelve pooled compulsory
licenses by all the participating states.
The RPSC would proceed to tender offers seeking to fulfill these needs as
agents of the governments emitting the compulsory licenses. In executing its
mandate, the regional authority may first seek to meet its needs through
voluntary purchases of genuine goods from authorized distributors operating
within the region, on the condition that such providers made their products
available at acceptable, negotiated prices, notwithstanding any patents they
possessed. The regional entity, acting on behalf of its buyer governments,
234 See K. Outterson, above n 224, at 171–73.
235 See e.g. various proposals by James Love, including Proposal for Patent Pool for Essential
Medicines (PPEM), Addis Ababa—3 March 2005, available at http://www.cptech.org/cm/
addisababa03032005.html. See also Anthony D. So, ‘Enabling Conditions for the Scientific
Commons’, presented at the conference, Technology Development in the Life Sciences:
Intellectual Property and Public Investment in Pharmaceuticals and Agriculture/, hosted by
the Program on Science, Technology and Global Development, The Earth Institute at
Columbia University (20–21 May 2004; New York City). Available at: www.earthinstitute.
columbia.edu/cgsd/events/documents/so.ppt.
236 The concept of territorial segmentation of patent rights was strongly advocated by the late
Prof. Jean Lanjouw in various papers (e.g. J. O. Lanjouw, Beyond TRIPS: A New Global
Patent Regime, Policy Brief No. 3, The Center for Global Development, July 2002, at http://
www.cgdev.org/fellows/lanjouw.html; J. O. Lanjouw, ‘A Patent Policy for Global Diseases:
US and International Legal Issues’, 16 Harv J L & Tech, 86 (2002); J. O. Lanjouw, A Patent
Proposal for Global Diseases, Policy Brief No. 84, The Brookings Institution, June 2001; and
J. O. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries,
Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 5, April 2002), and has since found its
way into practical application by institutions such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases
initiative (DNDi), in licensing arrangements with originator enterprises.
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could thus conduct price negotiations, with a view to inducing rights holders
to become low bidders on the project.
If such a deal were concluded, the rights holders would themselves supply
the entire regional market under the auspices of the RPSC at the agreed
prices, which would apply market-wide or in negotiated tiers. Such a
settlement could envision licensing, technical assistance and the provision of
key active ingredients to a local partner, which could obviate the need for
imports from beyond the region.
In these negotiations, the patentees know that if no agreement were
reached, a supply of generics might otherwise be commissioned from low-
cost suppliers elsewhere, say, in India, China or Brazil. The foreign patentee
also understands that in dealing positively with the RPSC, it stands to
enhance its trademark and to preserve market share in the entire region
against future competitors, while still selling at a price sufficiently above
marginal costs of production to justify the effort.237
Alternatively, the Directors of the RSPC (who could be proxies for the
respective health ministries) may offer the foreign originator the possibility of
selling the patented products at better than rock bottom prices if it
established local production facilities in the region. Here the carrot is that
the foreign producer who established a manufacturing foothold in the
territory would be rewarded by a more favorable remuneration package and
by the prospects of supplying the entire regional market.238 If the foreign
patentee opts to locate in the region, either directly, or through a local
partner, the RSPC obtains a reliable, quality local producer, with the
possibility of transfers of technology and know-how over time and of long-
term collaboration with the RSPC, which should be of reciprocal interest to
all concerned.
However, the sticks under this scenario are that if the foreign patentee
declines the invitation either to sell at low prices or to produce locally,
despite appropriate incentives, the RSPC can either purchase the needed
products abroad, under the compulsory licensing system of Article 31bis, or
attempt to entice foreign generic producers in India, China, Brazil and
elsewhere, to establish local production facilities in the regional territory
under Article 31bis(3). Here the preferred solution would be to locate such a
production facility in a designated LDC territory that need not protect
237 While Pharma enterprises could, in principle, threaten to walk away, as they have in the past,
some recent statements by a spokesman for the industry have suggested a more cooperative
attitude, with assurances that the companies would not walk away from these markets. See
I.P. Watch (2006). This attitude may reflect a more realistic assessment of the potential
future value of the African market and of the growing capacity of others to enter it.
238 Cf. James Love, ‘Four Practical Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies’, in
Negotiating Health, above n 195, at 241, 246–7.
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pharmaceuticals until 2016, if technical and logistic barriers can be
overcome.239
A local producer in such a territory, once it had established WHO-certified
quality controls and sufficient manufacturing capacity, could become a
formidable supplier of low-cost generics to a large area even without resort
to compulsory licenses. In other words, local producers working closely
with RSPCs could create in Africa something akin to the highly successful
generic production base that was previously developed in India, prior to
the TRIPS Agreement of 1994. Given these prospects, moreover, Pharma
firms may be more likely to decide that the preservation of future market
shares, among other considerations, was a sufficient reason to cooperate
with the RSPC and not default a substantial continental market to generic
competitors.
2. A smaller model with or without LDCs
Although a pooled procurement strategy operating under a large regional
model like that just described yields the maximum bargaining clout,
much smaller variations on this theme will still give economies of scale
and scope that should prove attractive to foreign suppliers and investors.
For example, even a three-country model in Africa, where two of the
participants were LDCs, could produce considerable bargaining power
through pooled compulsory licenses. Under either the large or the small
model, drugs shipped into or produced in any one of the participants could
be re-exported to all the other participants without additional external
compulsory licenses, given the facilitations afforded by pending Article 31bis
to certain regional trade agreements.240
If, instead, one looks to a region, such as Latin America, where there are
many poor countries but few LDCs, a pooled procurement strategy still
makes sense. Three small countries bargaining collectively with either
the patentees or potential generic suppliers under the double compulsory
licensing system of Article 31bis could still muster a lot more bargaining
power than any of the countries proceeding separately. On this scenario,
however, there would exist technical obstacles to re-exporting the products
239 WTO Ministers agreed in Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration that Least Developed
Members should not be obligated to implement or apply TRIPS provisions for
pharmaceutical product patents or data protection until 1 January 2016. Just as important,
they agreed that Least Developed Members already allowing for such protection did not
need to ‘enforce’ such rules until that later date. The TRIPS Council adopted a decision
confirming this flexibility. Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002. The WTO
General Council added a waiver of Least Developed Members’ obligations regarding
so-called exclusive marketing rights that might otherwise have been used as a substitute for
patent protection to block production, import, and sale of medicines. WTO General
Council, WT/L/478, 12 July 2002 Least-Developed Country Members—Obligations Under
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision of
8 July 2002.
240 Para 3, Article 31bis, above n 37.
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from one participant to another, so shipments and other procedures would
have to be coordinated.241
3. Fulfilling technology transfer obligations under Article 66.2
If OECD countries supported the initiatives outlined above, they could
provide grants, subsidies and tax concessions to pharmaceutical companies
that cooperated with Regional Pharmaceutical Supply Centers. In so doing,
these countries would be fulfilling their duties to help establish a viable
technological base in LDCs under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Of particular interest here is the possibility that the patentees’ own gov-
ernments might become willing to make patented technology available
through buy-out, patent pools or arrangements for geographically segmented
licensing.242
In this connection, the German Development Agency, in cooperation with
UNCTAD, UNIDO and DFID, has focused considerable efforts and funds
to promote local production in LDCs during the lengthened transitional
period that was recently established. The European Parliament has also
taken steps to encourage all its Member States to support this initiative, and
it has asked the Commission to devise a plan for so doing.243
4. Technical cooperation between developing countries
The architecture of Article 31bis presupposes that poor countries lacking
capacity to manufacture needed medicines under compulsory licenses would
seek assistance from developed countries, or at least from large, middle-
income developing countries, such as India, China and Brazil. In reality, if
efforts to expand local production capabilities succeeded, the number of
potential assisting suppliers for any given product could multiply.
Any developing country with the capacity to produce a drug needed by
another developing country could come to the assistance of the latter country
under the double compulsory licensing system to be established by Article
31bis. Over time, this network of mutual assistance could grow into a for-
midable self-help production system, which could exert pressure on pat-
entees everywhere to price discriminate on a ‘high-volume–low-margin’ basis
in developing countries generally.
D. The overriding importance of stimulating local production
Disregarding the double compulsory licensing scheme envisioned by Article
31bis, the Ministerial action initiated in 2001 created unique opportunities
for establishing local production of pharmaceuticals in LDCs by exempting
them from any duty to patent (or enforce patents on) medicines until
241 See above nn 108–10 and accompanying text.
242 See above text accompanying nn 234–6.
243 See European Parliament Resolution of 12 July 2007, above n 44, paras 3–6.
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2016.244 As the German Development Agency has clearly recognized,
this temporal window of opportunity makes it possible to recreate, on the
territory of willing LDCs, the kind of generic pharmaceutical production
base that was fostered in India, over a much longer period of time. Given the
flexibilities sanctioned by TRIPS, Doha and the post-Doha regimes,
moreover, the emergence of growing capacities in these countries (and in
other cooperating developing countries) could be pooled and focused on
spreading supplies of generic substitutes throughout the developing world at
affordable prices.
Of course, doubters will argue that LDCs in Africa or elsewhere lack
comparative advantages in this area, and would likely require substantial
external assistance, which is correct. But this view overlooks the need for
a certain level of autonomy in maintaining the supply of public health as a
public good that all governments must address. The negative view also
ignores the potential comparative advantages that LDCs in Africa and else-
where might eventually derive from stores of biogenetic diversity and tradi-
tional knowledge, once a viable technological base was established.245 If the
European Commission helped to enlarge the German initiative to the point
where promoting local production in LDCs became a Community-wide
commitment,246 the prospects for changing the facts on the ground during
the LDC window of opportunity (at least until 2016) would be endless.
In this connection, we stress that potential generic manufacturers locating
in the LDCs do not need any compulsory licenses at all to operate until
2016. Moreover, through buyouts, patent pools or similar arrangements,
willing governments—or the Commission—could indemnify originator phar-
maceutical companies for lost R&D recoveries that resulted from establishing
production in poor countries and from assisting other such countries to
obtain the relevant medicines. Precisely because pharmaceutical companies
currently do not look to these markets for recuperating research expenditures
on global diseases, costs of buy outs or pooling arrangements would be low
and risks are minimized.247
244 Doha Declaration, above n 33, para 7, and implementing action by Council for TRIPS and
General Council, (Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, and Decision of the
General Council of 8 July 2002, available at http://www.wto.org). See note 239 above and
also above n 27 and accompanying text.
245 See e.g. Graham Dutfield, ‘Legal and Economic Aspects of Traditional Knowledge’, in IP
and International Public Goods, above n 7, at 495–520; Jerome H. Reichman and Tracy
Lewis, ‘Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries:
Application to Traditional Knowledge’, in International Public Goods, above n 7, at 337–66;
Emanuela Arezzo, ‘Struggling Around the ‘‘Natural’’ Divide: The Protection of Tangible and
Intangible Indigenous Property’, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent L J 367–415 (2007).
246 See European Parliament 12 July 2007 Resolution, above n 44, to this effect.
247 See K. Outterson, above n 224, at 171, (noting that under a buyout proposal ‘the present IP
system is retained for more than 80% of the global patent-based cash flow of the
pharmaceutical companies’.)
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Under these types of arrangements, the technology procurers—who could
be governments (such as the EU), intergovernmental organizations (such as
WHO, UNDP or the Global Fund), or private foundations—could acquire
and make available patent rights for specific medicines for particular geo-
graphic markets.248 A patent owner could be compensated under a transfer
of rights (including pooling) formula, ‘which mimics the lost R&D cost
recovery from the foregone sales’.249
R&D cost recovery from developing countries is so low under current
projections that buy outs and essential medicines patent pooling arrange-
ments would be extremely cheap compared to other methods of assistance.
Once a transfer of rights occurred, and the license was issued, Prof.
Outterson contends that competition should ‘drive the unit price down
towards the actual marginal cost of production’.250 Lower prices should also
discourage the production of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, limiting the
incentive to counterfeit drugs in the low- and middle-income countries.251
E. Obstacles to obtaining key active ingredients (APIs)
Much also depends on the ability of potential suppliers to obtain key APIs.
The production of these ingredients is increasingly outsourced to firms in
certain developing countries, but subject to patent rights and other pressures
that effectively reduce their availability to would-be user countries.
This need for APIs, a problem in the best of circumstances, becomes more
acute if originator enterprises retaliate against the issuance of compulsory
licenses by refusing to register new drugs for market approval. In principle,
this form of retaliation leaves affected countries free to obtain the products
anywhere or to reverse-engineer them under compulsory licenses (possibly as
a remedy for patent abuse) for local production. In practice, the task of reverse-
engineering can become difficult and costly, and may entail major funding
to defray the medicinal chemistry involved. Skills might have to be provided
by either existing generic suppliers (in India, Brazil and China) or by a
network of universities willing to work in this area. Indeed, Pharma companies
may calculate that the costs of reverse-engineering would persuade govern-
ments to accept their higher priced offers rather than assume these risks.
The potential difficulties and costs of reverse-engineering needed compo-
nents of new drugs are increased by possible legal restrictions on research
exemptions under the laws where that analysis occurs.252 Here much
248 Ibid. The purchasers would then offer ‘an open, nonexclusive, no royalty license to any
legitimate generic manufacturer, but only for sale in the target markets’. OECD countries
would continue to practise normal patent-based pricing.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid, at 173.
251 Ibid.
252 For a very restrictive common law approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in the United Sates., see Madey v Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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depends on the exceptions to the patent holder’s exclusive rights that may
apply in the country where reverse-engineering takes place. Of course, any
analysis of this kind conducted in LDCs should be free of patent protection,
if the LDC has avoided enacting relevant patent laws under the extension or
has moved to disapply its patent laws for medicines under the new
dispensation. However, the available skills in these countries remain scarce,
unless they were bolstered by transplants from foreign universities and
research institutes, or by transplanted generic industries, e.g. Indian generic
producers in Bangladesh.
Technical assistance could come from a network of willing universities and
research institutes in developed countries, especially if sufficient funds were
made available for this purpose. However, the pharmaceutical companies
would likely exert pressure on any universities that cooperated in such a
venture.
F. Countervailing pressures by industry and governments
Much depends on the attitudes of OECD governments, especially the
United States and the EU. If they support Pharma enterprises and put
pressure on developing countries and LDCs, their threats and other
measures can divide local governments internally (e.g. Trade Ministry
versus Health Ministry) and retard or suffocate efforts to use the TRIPS/
Doha flexibilities and the Amendment to the full. Hopefully, the controversy
surrounding Thailand’s recent grants of compulsory licenses may eventually
establish a new equilibrium more conducive to cooperation rather than
confrontation.253
It is worth noting that countermeasures taken or threatened by some
governments may cross the line of legality under international law. For
example, the United States has put both Thailand and Brazil on its priority
watch list under Section 301 of the Trade Act.254
This approach may conflict with the duties of WTO Members to avoid
taking unilateral acts concerning impediments to their expected benefits
under the WTO Agreement, as set out in Article 23.1 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.255 Query whether recent actions against both
But, for a liberal statutory approach taken by the US Supreme Court in respect of
pharmaceutical research, see Merck v Integra Lifesciences, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
253 See above nn 141–59 and accompanying text. cf. Kal Raustiala, ‘Compliance & Effectiveness
in International Regulatory Cooperation’, 32 Case West Reserve J Int’l L 387 (2000); J. H.
Reichman, ‘The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developed Countries?’, 32 Case Western Res J Int’l L 441 (2000).
254 See above n 149 and accompanying text.
255 See DSU, Article 23; United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of
the Panel, WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999.
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Brazil and Thailand are consistent with these undertakings, not to mention
with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.
G. New patent incentives and old market failures
In a recent article, Maskus and Reichman suggested that the TRIPS Agree-
ment had given rise to ‘an incipient transnational system of innovation’.256
As developing countries begin to harness some of the potential benefits that
system provides, while struggling to contain its social costs, their entre-
preneurs may respond positively to the incentive effects that a relatively
harmonized, worldwide patent system affords.
1. Stimulating private R&D investment in poverty-related, tropical
or neglected diseases
In the pharmaceutical sector, developing countries having significant generic
production capacities in place, along with a basic infrastructure geared to
innovation, may witness a shift to more research-based investments in the
future, in place of reverse-engineered substitutes for existing drugs. Some
evidence suggests that India is moving in this direction.257 Whether research-
based investments in these countries would be directed to poverty-related,
tropical or neglected diseases, as one would hope,258 or to the health prob-
lems that define lucrative markets in OECD countries, remains to be seen.
Should private sector investments actually lead to the discovery of new
drugs aimed specifically at poverty-related, tropical or neglected diseases,
the patent system would have achieved one of its goals, and the market
failure currently experienced with regard to public health needs of the South
might shrink. If this hypothesis materialized over time, which is certainly a
possibility, developing country governments should adjust their public health
policies and strategies with a view to encouraging rather dampening such
initiatives.
Unlike the situation today, where the major pharmaceutical companies
expect to recoup their investments in the OECD countries and developing
country markets are relatively incidental to this goal, the hypothetical
company that discovers a cure for neglected diseases in the future would
have to recoup its costs and make a profit in the poorer markets where the
disease was rampant. On this scenario, the need to encourage socially
beneficial private investment must be reconciled with short- and long-term
public health needs, and caution with respect to compulsory licensing should
be in order, lest the incentive to invest be curtailed.
Much would depend on the marketing strategy of the patentee who
discovered the cure for a relevant disease. Precisely because it is dealing
256 Maskus and Reichman, ‘Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods’, above n 7.
257 See e.g. Janice Mueller, The Tiger Awakens, above n 28.
258 Cf. Henry Grabowski, ‘Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases: Lessons from the
Orphan Drug Act’, in IP and International Public Goods, above n 7, at 457–80.
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with diseases of the poor, the company may voluntarily adopt a marketing
strategy based on a high volume of sales and low marginal returns, in order
to distribute the drug across the widest possible base of potential patients.259
In that event, IPRs in combination with socially desirable marketing
strategies would have solved the problem, without government intervention.
To the extent some government intervention might still be needed, price
controls afford an intermediate option that has proved workable in many
OECD countries.
If, instead, a developing country firm that discovered a cure for a
widespread Southern disease engaged in the ‘low volume, high marginal
returns’ marketing strategy that big pharmaceutical companies tend to
pursue today, it would invite government scrutiny and the possible threat of
compulsory licensing along the lines discussed above. In practice, however,
one would hope that private-sector pharmaceutical companies dedicated to
discovering cures for poverty-related, tropical or neglected diseases would
find it in their self interest—both socially and economically—to pursue
a strategy based on high volume and low margins. In that event, their
financial success, if it materialized, might help persuade the big pharma-
ceutical companies to adopt similar strategies when marketing their products
to poor countries, in which case many of the current problems would be
solved.
2. Changing the marketing model
From the foregoing analysis, it must be clear that the overall objective of
the flexibilities envisioned in Amendment Article 31bis is not to drive the
originator companies out of these markets, nor is it to reduce the incentive
effects that stronger patent protection may exert in stimulating R&D outside
the OECD countries. What, instead, the use of TRIPS flexibilities needs
to achieve is to persuade Pharma to change its marketing strategy in poor
countries from a low volume–high margin approach to a high volume–low
margin approach.
In a long-term perspective, moreover, more thought must be given to
lessening the private sector’s burdens with respect to clinical trial costs,
and to the potential advantages likely to accrue from treating these costs as
a global public good, whose benefits could also be shared by scientists
and researchers worldwide.260 While we lack the space to elaborate on this
proposal here, it is clear that many of the inequities, hardships and
bureaucratic obstacles being imposed on developing countries in order to
defray the growing financial burden that clinical trials places on the
shoulders of the private sector could be relieved by a more rational reform
259 See e.g. the approach of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), described at
http://www.dndi.org/.
260 See generally, Lewis, Reichman and So, above n 216.
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based on the recognition that governments are in the best position to provide
and regulate essential public goods.261
3. The continuing role of public–private partnerships
As matters stand, however, we remain a long way from seeing private sector
remedies for diseases afflicting poor countries. The existing situation is,
instead, characterized by a pronounced market failure, in which diseases of
particular relevance to developing countries are significantly under-
researched.262
Given this market failure, the best immediate hope is the growing success
of the Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) that have been formed to address
these diseases. As recently reported, there are now over 60 ongoing research
projects sponsored by PPPs, and six or seven new drug registrations are
expected in the next five years. However, in many cases private foundations
provide the bulk of PPP funding, and contributions from governments
remain lower than might be hoped.263
Here patents may constitute a barrier to entry unless they are pooled for
these purposes, which should be encouraged. Similarly, universities in
OECD countries should be encouraged to ensure that government-funded
research results are made available to poor countries under humanitarian
licenses.264 Above all, funds are needed from OECD governments sufficient
to ensure that PPP-sponsored research continues at a proper pace.265
4. Strengthening the global scientific foundation
The existing market failures make it especially important for the public
sector to fund research on relevant diseases and, to this end; governments
should seek to strengthen the scientific and technical foundations in the
affected countries. Here, funds are needed to support local research capac-
ities, especially at universities, and to promote long-term benefits of coop-
eration with universities in OECD countries, which could strengthen the
scientific and technical base in participating poor countries over time.
Institutions such as UNESCO, Third World Academies and the US National
Academies could assist in this regard, with funds from the United States and
the EU.266
261 Cf. Drahos, above n 13 at 46–64.
262 See e.g. Sarah Ramsay, ‘No closure in sight for the 10/90 health-research gap’, 358 Lancet
1348 (2001).
263 See e.g. Nicoletta Dentico, ‘DNDi’s antimalarial: a new public good for neglected patients,
presented at Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: EU Input to the
Global Debate, organized by the European Commission Health and Consumer Protection
Directorate-General, 2 April 2007. This is not intended to discount the importance of
contributions made so far to DNDi by, inter alia, the British and Dutch governments.
264 See e.g. Amy Kapczynski et al., ‘Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations’, 20 Berkeley Tech L J 1031 (2005).
265 See European Parliament 12 July 2007 Resolution, above n 44, to this effect.
266 See European Parliament 12 July 2007 Resolution, above n 44, to this effect.
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Thinking boldly, one might establish a well-funded, peer-reviewed grant
making body, modeled on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the
United States, which would support medical research in and for developing
country diseases. This approach might appeal to young scientists in
developing countries and provide them with opportunities and outlets for
innovative proposals that do not otherwise exist at the present time.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Members of the WTO are assessing whether to ratify the Article 31bis
Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. The Amendment embodies a
compromise among various stakeholders involved in researching and
developing new medicines, manufacturing and distributing them, prescribing
and delivering treatment, and those advocating on behalf of patients.
The compromise involved government ministries seeking to promote the
industrial policy interests of their nationally based producers and government
ministries concerned with protecting the public health of their citizens.
The process of negotiation was long and difficult, and no stakeholder
achieved all of its objectives. From whatever perspective one approaches
the Amendment, it is imperfect.
For those whose foremost priority is ensuring access to medicines for
the widest number of individuals, the principal questions are (i) whether
there is a reasonable prospect of negotiating a less administratively
cumbersome solution to the Article 31(f) problem and, if not (ii) whether
it would be better to forego the Amendment.
We believe that the most likely outcome of further WTO negotiations on
the subject matter of the Amendment would be an impasse. Demands to
streamline the administrative process would be met with counter-demands to
limit the scope of eligible diseases and country users. As evidence to support
this belief, we refer to the aggressive reaction by the EU and United States,
and by major multinational pharmaceutical producers, to the recent issuance
of compulsory licenses in Brazil and Thailand. The rhetoric of the industrial
lobby and supporting governments points strongly in the direction of seeking
to limit compulsory licensing to a narrow class of medical conditions and
per capita GDP levels.
The world political situation is always changing. A new Executive adminis-
tration in the United States might endorse a more pro-access policy than the
current administration. Recent efforts by the Democratic majority in Con-
gress to rein-in USTR’s advocacy of pharmaceutical industry interests point
in this direction. Yet the European Commission appears increasingly willing
to take on the mantle of pharmaceutical industry champion. And, these are
only the primary government actors. Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore,
Switzerland and other high-income WTO Members are also pursuing high
IP-protection policies, and any one of these Members might block efforts to
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streamline the Amendment. Moreover, a number of important developing
country governments are internally divided on issues of intellectual property
protection and access to medicines. Whether the alignment and commit-
ments of developing countries in a new set of negotiations would be the same
as those in the earlier negotiations remains to be seen.
We have only a limited basis on which to foresee the results and con-
sequences of IGWG discussions at the WHO. Based on developments so far,
with most governments having expressed views in the IGWG process
consistent with those expressed in other forums, we deem it unlikely that the
WHO process will provide the basis for renewed negotiations on the
Amendment at the WTO, though certainly this could happen.
Our judgment is that re-opening negotiations on the Amendment might as
likely result in a more restrictive arrangement as a more streamlined one.
Meanwhile, the Waiver Decision was expressly designed to remain in effect
until it had been accepted by all WTO Members. From this standpoint,
there is no compelling reason to press for early ratification of the
Amendment. If it does not come into effect in 2007, it can come into
effect in 2008, or for that matter, it need not come into effect at all. The
Waiver Decision is permanent from a legal standpoint, unless and until the
Amendment is accepted by all WTO Members.
In light of the legal status of the Waiver Decision, it can and has been argued
that more time should be given for problems to surface before converting it
into the ‘fixed’ form of the Amendment. This is a reasonable argument.
Nevertheless, given the political rhetoric employed by the multinational
pharmaceutical industry and supporting governments, we worry that failure
to bring the Amendment into force might provide the basis for a concerted
campaign to undermine the Waiver Decision’s vitality. Delay in ratification
would be portrayed by some governments, the multinational pharmaceutical
industry and prominent financial media outlets as a rejection of the solution.
Government and industry pressure may persuade more economically
vulnerable governments not to pursue implementation of the solution in
national law, or to be reluctant to use it in practice. We believe these risks
argue in favor of a more or less timely ratification of the Amendment, though
we accept that reasonable minds can differ about the degree of risk
associated with delay, or even failure to ratify.
What matters is that governments implement the Waiver Decision and/or
Amendment in national law employing all options for maximum flexibility in
its use. We further urge developing country governments to pursue programs
of cooperation that will permit them to take advantage of economies of scale
in purchasing, as well as in the production and distribution of pharmaceu-
tical products.
The Waiver Decision and Amendment each expressly provide that they are
without prejudice to other rights Members may have under the TRIPS
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Agreement. We re-emphasize our view that Article 30 remains a viable
option for generic-producer exports of patented pharmaceuticals in
circumstances that fall within the terms and context of that Article. The
somewhat restrictive approach to interpretation of Article 30 by the panel in
the Canada-Generic Pharmaceuticals case267 was adopted prior to the Doha
Declaration, which placed Article 30 in a new interpretative framework. The
WTO Appellate Body has recognized the evolutionary nature of WTO and
international law in its Shrimp-Turtles decision and elsewhere.268
The OECD governments constantly argue that higher standards of intel-
lectual property protection will encourage ‘transfers of technology’ to
developing countries, which is essential for accelerated progress. But
OECD governments suggest that technology transfer occurs through the
operation of ‘free-market’ forces. At least in the pharmaceutical sector, the
evidence to support this thesis is not compelling. The major multinational
pharmaceutical companies do not ‘out-license’ newer products for manu-
facture and distribution by developing country enterprises; research and
development is concentrated in the home countries of major producers; and
manufacturing facilities are shuttered and relocated as a matter of economic
convenience.
The evidence suggests that the wealthy OECD nations are little inclined
to promote the development of world-class pharmaceutical producers in
poor countries, which might eventually compete with the existing originators.
The rhetoric of ‘transfer of technology’ does not extend to the reality of
investment in plant and equipment, upgrading systems for compliance with
OECD GMP quality standards, or to the licensing of important pharma-
ceutical compounds.269 There is a great deal of pharmaceutical technology
expertise available ‘for hire’, and pharmaceutical equipment manufacturers
are willing sellers. The inhibitions on building up developing country phar-
maceutical capacity are mainly financial, although intellectual property issues
must and can be addressed if there is a will to do it. We strongly encourage a
more proactive role for OECD transfer of technology to the developing
country pharmaceutical sector. At the very least, OECD governments should
not stand in the way of South–South cooperation.
267 Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000.
268 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998. See also Christine Godt,
above n 161, at 227–28 (stressing power of multilateral consent to control extraterritorial
effects), and; Garrison above n 164.
269 See e.g. Claudia Chamas, Developing Innovative Capacity in Brazil to Meet Health Needs,
MIHR Study for WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public
Health, WHO Ref. CIPIH Study 10d (DGR), April 2005, at 94; Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira
et al., ‘Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Brazil: who is benefiting’, in J. Bermudez and
M. Oliveira (eds), 2004 Intellectual Property in the Context of the WTO TRIPS Agreement:
Challenges for Public Health (FIOCRUZ, ENSP, PAHO 2004), at 161, 172–74.
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The pressing need for more research and development on treatments for
poverty-related, tropical and ‘neglected diseases’ has certainly captured the
attention of governments. Today, much of the important work in this area is
being done by PPPs, with a substantial portion of the money coming from
private foundation donors (such as the Gates Foundation). Creative new
structures, such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), are
up and running and it is essential that the scale of government contributions
to these efforts be increased.
Whether the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement, including those
embodied in the Amendment, will withstand assault from the multinational
purveyors of knowledge goods that are driving the WIPO SPLT negotiations
and the bilateral and regional FTAs and EPAs remains to be seen. The
SPLT negotiations could reduce flexibilities across the board for all
countries, while the bilaterals and FTAs have significantly cut back on the
ability of national governments to provide public goods that involve intel-
lectual property inputs. The European Commission’s decision to follow
a more aggressive intellectual property strategy in the EPAs being negotiated
with the ACP countries is particularly worrisome in this regard.
Some observers, including one of the authors of this report, have gone on
record to urge ‘a moratorium on further intellectual property standard
setting exercises’, in order to give the incipient transnational system of
innovation, triggered by TRIPS, time to breathe and grow.270
At the heart of the intellectual property-access to medicines debate lies the
fact that the world community seeks to address a ‘public goods’ problem
with a ‘private market’ solution. The Doha Declaration recognizes a
collective obligation to promote access to medicines ‘for all’.271 We know
that the private market can not meet that goal, and governmental measures
are necessary to factor out the income curve when it comes to purchasing
medicines necessary to sustain life. Failure to confront this truth results in an
endless cycle of conflict, and leaves us with an unresolved collective action
problem on a grand scale.
270 Maskus and Reichman, ‘Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods’, above n 7.
271 See also Thomas Cottier, ‘The Doha Waiver’, above n 85, at 198 (stressing role of human
rights to health and life underlying Doha Waiver and Amendment).
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